This short note exhibits a truthful-in-expectation O( logm log logm )-approximation mechanism for combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders that uses polynomial communication.

Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary. Determining the winners is NP-complete and inapproximable, but it was recently shown that optimal search algorithms do very well on average. This paper presents a more sophisticated search algorithm for optimal (and anytime) winner determination, including...

Combinatorial auctions can be used to reach efficient resource and task allocations in multiagent systems where the items are complementary or substitutable. Determining the winners is NPcomplete and inapproximable, but it was recently shown that optimal search algorithms do very well on average. This paper presents a more sophisticated search algorithm for optimal (and anytime) winner determin...

This paper presents a novel incentive-based load shedding management scheme within microgrid environment equipped with the required IoT infrastructure. The proposed mechanism works on principles of reverse combinatorial auction. We consider region multiple consumers who are willing to curtail their in peak hours order gain some incentives later. Using properties auctions, participants can bid p...

Combinatorial auctions are currently used for a wide variety of B2B commerce, most notably for industrial procurement of raw materials and shipping lanes, and in the government sector for the allocation of spectrum licenses, wholesale electricity generation, and the proposed control of airport congestion through the auctioning of landing-slot rights. In this paper we summarize the contributions...

Combinatorial Auctions (CAs) are promising to increase social welfare by enabling bidders to express their valuation on any combination of items. A major issue of many CAs is the requirement to optimally solve the NP-hard Combinatorial Allocation Problem. To release a centralized auctioneer from that computational burden he can shift it to the bidders. One of the few discussed decentralized auc...

Combinatorial auctions, i.e. auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auctions in multi-item auctions where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners so as to maximize revenue is NP-complete. First, existing approaches for tackling this problem are reviewed: exhaustive enumer...

Combinatorial auctions, in which bidders can bid on combinations of assets (commonly referred to as bundles or packages), represent an innovative yet complex market mechanism that can enhance the ability to allocate multiple assets efficiently when the values of the assets exhibit synergies (e.g., “I will pay $100 if I get both matching end tables but only $40 for either one separately”). Altho...

In this paper, we present a preliminary idea about applying multi-unit combinatorial auctions to an electric power allocation problem when it includes sustainable power sources and it considers guaranteeing stable continuous use of the supplied power. Multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can bee seen as indistinguishable. Theoretically, such mecha...

In this paper, we present a preliminary idea about applying multi-unit combinatorial auctions to an electric power allocation problem when it includes sustainable power sources and it considers guaranteeing stable continuous use of the supplied power. Multi-unit combinatorial auction is a combinatorial auction that has some items that can bee seen as indistinguishable. Theoretically, such mecha...