A re-refinement of 4xan, hen egg-white lysozyme (HEWL) with carboplatin crystallized in NaBr solution, has been made and is published here as an addendum to Tanley et al. [(2014), Acta Cryst. F70, 1135-1142]. This follows a previous re-refinement and PDB deposition (4yem) by Shabalin et al. [(2015), Acta Cryst. D71, 1965-1979]. The critical evaluation of the original PDB deposition (4xan), and ...

This paper investigates the informational requirements of resource allocation processes in public goods economies with any number of firms and commodities. We show that the Lindahl mechanism is informationally efficient in the sense that it uses the smallest message space among smooth resource allocation processes that are informationally decentralized and realize Pareto optimal allocations ove...

By definition, “consequentialist” behaviour in finite decision trees is explicable by its consequences. Both cost-benefit tests and “consequentialist” choices of economic policy necessarily require distributional judgements. These should emerge from a social welfare objective incorporating interpersonal comparisons. To accommodate them, Arrow’s IIA condition should be weakened to independence o...

When individual judgments (‘yes’ or ‘no’) on some propositions are aggregated into collective judgments, outcomes may be sensitive to the choice of propositions under consideration (the agenda). Such agenda-sensitivity opens the door to manipulation by agenda setters. I define three types of agenda-insensitivity (‘basic’, ‘full’, and ‘focal’) and for each type axiomatically characterize the agg...

For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q−separable preferences over subsets of workers we show that the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers. Therefore, in centralized markets like entry-level professional labor markets if the proposed matching is the workers-optimal stable matching then, no group of workers can never b...

Strategy-proof social choice functions are characterized for societies where the space of alternatives is any full dimensional compact subset of a Euclidean space and all voters have generalized single-peaked preferences. Our results build upon and extend those obtained for cartesian product ranges by Border and Jordan (1983). By admitting a large set of non-Cartesian ranges, we give a partial ...

This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals’judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We …rst translate a proof o...

A general model of judgment aggregation is presented in which judgments on propositions are not binary but come in degrees. The primitives of the model are a set of propositions, an entailment relation, and a “triangular norm” which establishes a lower bound on the degree to which a proposition is true whenever it is entailed by a set of propositions. For an important class of agendas, we ident...

The class of algorithmically computable simple games (i) includes the class of games that have finite carriers and (ii) is included in the class of games that have finite winning coalitions. This paper characterizes computable games, strengthens the earlier result that computable games violate anonymity, and gives examples showing that the above inclusions are strict. It also extends Nakamura’s...

We propose two sequential mechanisms for efficient production of public goods. Our analysis differs from the existing literature in allowing for the presence of multiple public goods and in also being “simple.” While both mechanisms ensure efficiency, the payoffs in the first mechanism are asymmetric, being sensitive to the order in which agents move. The second mechanism corrects for this thro...