We consider pure exchange, one good OLG economies under stationary Markov uncertainty. It is known that when markets are sequentially complete, a stationary equilibrium at which the agents common matrix of intertemporal rates of substitution has a Perron root which is less than or equal to one is conditionally Pareto optimal (CPO). We assume that there exists a long-lived dividend paying asset ...

We solve the pricing problem for perpetual American puts and calls on dividend-paying assets. The dependence of a dividend process on the underlying stochastic factor is fairly general: any non-decreasing function is admissible. The stochastic factor follows a Lévy process. This specification allows us to consider assets that pay no dividends at all when the level of the underlying factor (say,...

The paper incorporates liquid reserves, interest and dividends in the compound Poisson surplus model. When an insurer’s surplus is below a certain level, it is kept as liquid reserves. As the surplus attains the level, the excess of the surplus above the level will earn interest at a constant interest rate. If the surplus continues to surpass a higher level, the excess of the surplus above this...

This paper develops and tests a dynamic, sequential equilibrium model of corporate cash payout policy that endogenizes a firm's dividend initiation decision, and its extreme reluctance to subsequently cut dividends in a sequential equilibrium. After payment of dividends, all excess cash is disgorged via stock repurchases that elicit no price reactions. The theoretical model generates results co...

This paper examines the implications of payout horizon for the prices of aggregate cashflows. The interaction of two long-run forces — a long-run risk in consumption and aggregate dividends, and a cointegration relationship between consumption and aggregate dividends — leads to non-monotonic relationships between a payout’s horizon and its cash flow risks, discount rate risks, and risk premia. ...

We derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous-time principal-agent setting, in which both investors and the agent learn about the firm’s profitability over time. Because investors learn about the firm’s future profitability from current output, which also depends upon the agent’s actions, deviations by the agent distort investors’ beliefs. We characterize the optimal contract, and show...