Due to the intensive usage of Game Theory in all industries, more and more studies have been made to investigate the new applications of it. This paper dedicated to verify and improve a new algorithm to solve the complicated multi-level games. Begins with a comprehensive literature review of the multi-level games topic, the report continues to test the algorithm on a modified duopoly model. Cor...

We model the organization of the firm as a type of artificial neural network in a duopoly framework. The firm plays a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma type game, but also must learn to map environmental signals to demand parameters. We study the prospects for cooperation given the need for the firm to learn the environment and its rival’s output. We show how a firm’s profit and cooperation rates are...

Due to income constraints, increased awareness of environmental protection and preference for new products, consumers generate switching purchases between remanufactured which often lead a “cannibalization effect” in the market, make sellers fall into vicious circle price reduction. Considering consumers’ purchase behavior, this study examines pricing problem products competitive market environ...

Product differentiation in durable-goods markets is often complicated by the fact that decision processes for the market participants are intrinsically dynamic. For example, consumers can employ a variety of consumption patterns with actions that vary in time, even for a single brand of goods. Transaction costs in selling used goods prompt consumers to think ahead in order to avoid adverse lock...

Abstract: This paper studies a continuous Bertrand duopoly game model with two-stage delay. Our aim is to investigate the influence of delay and weight on the complex dynamic characteristics of the system. We obtain the bifurcation point of the system respect to delay parameter by calculating. In addition, the dynamic properties of the system are simulated by power spectrum, attractor, bifurcat...

We study customization in a duopoly game in which the firms’ products have different qualities. Whether customization choices are made simultaneously or sequentially is endogenously determined. Specifically, the customization stage of the game involves two periods. Each firm either selects its product type in period 1 or postpones this decision to period 2. We show that both quality and endogen...

This paper analyses the scope for collusive behaviour within the context of an international duopoly supergame in which both firms and monopoly labour unions interact strategically. We find that the presence of unions, implying an endogenisation of production costs, dramatically alters the incentives for inter-firm collusion. There are, however, strong incentives for the unions to collude, rais...

An experiment is designed to test the implications of the equilibria typically studied in the repeated game literature (i.e. those based on Nash reversion and optimal symmetric two-phase punishment strategies). One hundred pairs of subjects repeatedly set prices in a differentiated demand duopoly setting. Unlike existing experiments there was no fixed end date or time constraint (some pairs pla...

In this paper, we experimentally investigate the extended game with action commitment of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). In their duopoly game, ...rms can choose their quantities in one of two periods before the market clears. If a ...rm commits to a quantity in period 1 it does not know whether the other ...rm also commits early. By waiting until period 2, a ...rm can observe the other ...rm’s pe...

Strict liability imposed on firms involved in an imperfect competition game (here duopoly) is not obstacle to achieving a socially optimal care level of care. However, when one input becomes scarce limited generic asset), the precedent result compromised. Duopolistic leads supply more goods at lower price equilibrium, but also compared monopoly placed similar conditions. When damage are too hig...