Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independent determination of each agent’s type (impatient or patient), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. For general preferences, we show, via a simple argume...

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dom...

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We study the optimal control of general stochastic McKean-Vlasov equation. Such problem is motivated originally from the asymptotic formulation of cooperative equilibrium for a large population of particles (players) in mean-field interaction under common noise. Our first main result is to state a dynamic programming principle for the value function in the Wasserstein space of probability measu...

The attempt to match asset price characteristics such as the risk-free interest rate, equity premium and the Sharpe ratio with data for models with instantaneous consumption decisions and time separable preferences has not been very successful. Many recent versions of asset pricing models have, in order to match those financial characteristics better with the data, employed habit formation wher...

this paper estimates a structural cointegrating varx model with exogenous variables for iran. the long-run macroeconomic relationships are identified and tested within this framework. we make use of the generalized forecast error variance decomposition to analyze the dynamic properties of the model in response to different shocks. we also examine via the persistence profiles, the speed of adjus...

We present a simple example where the use of σ-algebras as a model of information leads to a paradoxical conclusion: a decision maker prefers less information to more. We then explain that the problem arises because the use of σ-algebras as the informational content of a signal is inadequate. We provide a characterization of the different models of information in the literature in terms of Blac...

We prove that a preference relation which is continuous on every straight line has a utility representation if its domain is a convex subset of a finite dimensional vector space. Our condition on the domain of a preference relation is stronger than Eilenberg (1941) and Debreu (1959, 1964), but our condition on the continuity of a preference relation is strictly weaker than theirs. JEL classific...

We provide several generalizations of Mailath’s (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent’s strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously co...

This note illustrates that the saturation property of a probability space can be used to routinely generalize results on the integration of Banach valued correspondences over a Loeb measure space to those over an arbitrary saturated probability space. On the other hand, the saturation property is also necessary for the validity of those results when the target space is infinite dimensional. © 2...