Abstract Past reviews of studies concerning competitive pricing strategies lack a unifying approach to interdisciplinarily structure research across economics, marketing management, and operations. This academic void is especially unfortunate for online markets as they show much higher dynamics compared their offline counterparts. We review 132 articles on posted goods either e-tail or in gener...

OBJECTIVE To examine the association between hospital market concentration and pricing. BACKGROUND Hospitals have been merging into systems that potentially wield bargaining power over private health insurers. Concern is growing among policy makers that these systems may respond to provisions of the 2010 health reform legislation by further increasing consolidation and prices. METHODS Multi...

The Electronic Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Malone, Yates & Benjamin 1987) holds that electronic markets will eventually evolve towards unbiased markets under the pressure of both competitive and legal forces and that this process is inevitable in case of markets for commodities. Based on an initial literature review, we criticise the EMH for its definitional impreciseness, its disregard for strate...

Social capital is an important concept for multinational firms. Firms operating in global markets rarely have adequate resources to compete effectively in global markets; they access the needed resources through formal and informal relationships with other firms. The cultures in Asian countries have emphasized relationships much more strongly than Western firms. Thus, relational capital, based ...

Economic theory suggests that a monopolist can price discriminate more successfully than can a perfectly competitive firm. Most real-life markets, however, fall somewhere in between the two extremes. What happens as the market becomes more competitive: Does price discrimination increase or decrease? This paper examines how price discrimination changes with market concentration in the airline ma...

This paper studies the comparative statics of adding agents to matching markets that generalize the marriage and college-admissions markets of D. Gale and L. Shapley (Amer. Math. Monrh1.v 69, 1962, 9915). It is shown, for the wide class of matching markets studied by A. Roth (Econometrica 52, 1984, 47-57), that adding an agent to one side of the market weakens the competitive positions of the o...