I examine a model of artifact creation developed by (Houkes & Vermaas 2009). I suggest a way to extend the model by regarding the agents involved in the design and making of new artifacts to be cooperating in the ‘we-mode’ as described by Raimo Tuomela. Contrary to the authors’ own claims, I suggest that their model then becomes largely compatible with the ‘intentionalist’ view of artifacts pro...

This paper considers how environmental threat may contribute to the child's use of avoidant strategies to regulate negative emotions, and how this may interact with high emotional reactivity to create vulnerability to conduct disorder symptoms. We report a study based on the hypothesis that interpreting others' behaviours in terms of their motives and emotions-using the intentional stance-promo...

An adequate formulation of collective intentionality is crucial for understanding group activity and for modeling the mental state of participants in such activities. Although work on collective intentionality in philosophy, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science has many points of agreement, several key issues remain under debate. This paper argues that the dynamics of intention—in par...

Primate facial expressions are widely accepted as underpinned by reflexive emotional processes and not under voluntary control. In contrast, other modes of primate communication, especially gestures, are widely accepted as underpinned by intentional, goal-driven cognitive processes. One reason for this distinction is that production of primate gestures is often sensitive to the attentional stat...

Perceiving and evaluating intentional harms in an interpersonal context engages both cognitive and emotional domains. This process involves inference of intentions, moral judgment, and, crucially, empathy towards others' suffering. This latter skill is notably impaired in behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). However, the relationship between regional brain atrophy in bvFTD and de...

This paper introduces a model of human communication in which ‘accounting-for’ is the basis of meaning, and argues that interruptions should be handled in the same way as any other speech act. The model has at its core the idea that human languages are inherently intentional – we focus on our conversational partner’s goals – and that what is needed is mixed initiative at the level of intent. It...

John Dilworth, draft only, 7/04 The Reflexive Theory of Perception (RTP) claims that perception of an object X by an organism Z consists in Z being caused by X to acquire some disposition D toward X itself. This novel, purely naturalistic perceptual theory explains perceptual intentionality, correct versus incorrect perception and externalist content in a plausible evolutionary framework. The t...