When do competing principals independently choose to share the information obtained from their privately informed agents? Information sharing a¤ects contracting relationships within opponent organizations and induces players’strategies to be correlated via the distortions channel. We show that principals’incentives to share information depend on the nature of upstream externalities and the corr...

Updated guidance for writing a British Association of Dermatologists clinical guideline: the adoption of the GRADE methodology 2016 M.F. Mohd Mustapa, L.S. Exton, H.K. Bell, A.D. Ormerod, J.R. Hughes, N.J. Levell, C.H. Smith and P.M. McHenry British Association of Dermatologists, Willan House, 4 Fitzroy Square, London, W1T 5HQ, U.K. Department of Dermatology, Broadgreen Hospital, Thomas Drive, ...

This paper studies the impact of innovation on the organizational structure. The theoretical framework predicts that a larger parental pool of knowledge raises the probability of offshoring. This holds in a national as well as an international context. However, when the producer loses territorial protection, the changeover from non-integration to integration is delayed. Employing data on German...

This paper analyzes the structure and functions of suppliers’ associations (kyoryokukai) in the automobile industry in Japan. The bilateral assembler-supplier relationship has received much attention recently as a source of Japanese industrial competitiveness. However, this paper argues that the hitherto neglected area of inter-supplier coordination in technology diffusion is at least as import...

I present a model of dynamic pricing and diffusion of a network good sold by a monopolist. In the model, the network good is a subscription social network good. This means that in each period, each consumer has to pay a subscription price to use the good, and the utility derived from subscribing to the good increases as more of her neighboring consumers subscribe. Consumers myopically optimize ...

The largest decile of commercial electricity customers comprises half of commercial sector electricity usage. We quantify a considerable split incentives problem that exists when these large firms are on electricity-included property lease contracts. Controlling for a rich set of variables that may correlate with selection into contract type, we use exogenous variation in weather shocks to show...

Procurement contracts are often renegotiated because of changes that are required after their execution. Using highway paving contracts we show that renegotiation imposes significant adaptation costs. Reduced form regressions suggest that bidders respond strategically to contractual incompleteness and that adaptation costs are an important determinant of their bids. A structural empirical model...

Much of the existing literature in small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) finance surveys the impact of borrower and lender characteristics on firms’ credit availability, and it has already been established that there is a positive link between the strength of firm-bank relationship and the level of credit availability. In this paper, I focus on what determines the strength of relationship, me...

Reciprocal customers may disproportionately improve the performance of markets for experience goods. Reciprocal customers reward (punish) …rms for providing good (bad) quality by upholding (terminating) the customer relation. This may induce …rms to provide good quality which, in turn, may induce a positive externality for nonreciprocal customers who would, in the absence of reciprocal types, f...

An extensive literature shows that agency issues and transactions costs influence vertical integration. Another mature literature indicates that market structure influences competitive behavior. However, less consideration has been given to how vertical integration and market structure may interact. I address this gap by focusing on the potential for moral hazard caused by intra-firm competitio...