We address the problem of strategyproof (SP) facility location mechanisms on discrete trees. Our main result is a full characterization onto and SP mechanisms. In particular, we prove that when single agent significantly affects outcome, trajectory almost contained in agent, both move same direction along common edges. show tight relations our to previous results lines continuous then derive fu...

This paper focuses on a new Stackelberg location problem on a network with demands whose weights are given uncertainly and vaguely. By representing them as fuzzy random variables, the optimal location problem can be formulated as a fuzzy random programming problem for finding Stackelberg equilibrium. By using both their α-level sets for fuzziness and their satisfaction level for a given probabi...

We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line and partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose (where public facility be built) so as minimize total distance of from it. This process distributed: positions in each district first aggregated representative for district, then one representatives chosen location. indirect access ...

This paper focuses on a new Stackelberg location problem on a tree network with demands whose quantities are given uncertainly and vaguely. By representing their quantities as fuzzy random variables on the tree network, the optimal location problem can be formulated as a fuzzy random programming problem for finding Stackelberg equilibrium. By using both their α-level sets for fuzziness and thei...

In facility location games, one aims at designing a mechanism to decide the facility location based on the addresses reported by all agents. In the standard facility location game, each agent wants to minimize the distance from the facility, while in the obnoxious facility game, each agent prefers to be as far away from the facility as possible. In this paper we revisit the two games on a line ...