Over the past decade, intuitionist models of morality have challenged the view that moral reasoning is the sole or even primary means by which moral judgments are made. Rather, intuitionist models posit that certain situations automatically elicit moral intuitions, which guide moral judgments. We present three experiments showing that evaluations are also susceptible to the influence of moral v...

The importance of including cultural perspectives in the study of human cognition has become apparent in recent decades, and the domain of moral reasoning is no exception. The present review focuses on moral cognition, beginning with Kohlberg's model of moral development which relies heavily on people's justifications for their judgments and then shifting to more recent theories that rely on ra...

► We primed moral realism, the belief that moral facts are like mathematical truths. ► Priming meta-ethical views (realism vs. antirealism) affected actual behavior. ► Priming a belief in moral realism increased charitable giving. ► Moral realism may raise the moral stakes and motivate moral behavior. a b s t r a c t a r t i c l e i n f o People disagree about whether " moral facts " are object...

Do liberals and conservatives have qualitatively different moral points of view? Specifically, do liberals and conservatives rely on the same or different sets of moral foundations-care, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity (Haidt, 2012)-when making moral judgments about influential people? In Study 1, 100 experts evaluated the impact that 40 influential figures had on each moral foundation...

Although complexity and vulnerability assessment of mountain landscapes is increasingly taken into consideration, less attention is paid to ecophronesis-based solutions so as to reduce the fragile ecosystem vulnerability. The main propose of this study is to provide an insight of mountain complex landscape vulnerability and propose ecophronesis-based solutions in strategic planning framework fo...

This paper studies incentives provision when agents are characterized either by homo moralis preferences, i.e., their utility is represented by a convex combination of selfish preferences and Kantian morality, or by altruism. In a moral hazard in a team setting with two agents whose efforts affect output stochastically, I demonstrate that the power of extrinsic incentives decreases with the deg...

I critically examine the existing data in emotion research to show that empathy is not necessary for moral judgment. I argue that other emotions, such as disgust, are responsible for moral judgment, and that humans are able to make moral judgments without empathy. Autistic individuals are of interest because they are said to lack empathy, yet display some form of morality. Thus, empathy cannot ...