This contribution deals with a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game: A Subset Sum setting is addressed with a set $N$ of items with given integer weights. One distinguished player, the leader, may alter the weights of the items in a given subset $L\subset N$, and a second player, the follower, selects a solution $A\subseteq N$ in order to utilize a bounded...

Game-theoretic algorithms for physical security have made an impressive realworld impact. These algorithms compute an optimal strategy for the defender to commit to in a Stackelberg game, where the attacker observes the defender’s strategy and best-responds. In order to build the game model, though, the payoffs of potential attackers for various outcomes must be estimated; inaccurate estimates ...

We consider a dynamic game where additional players (assumed identical, even if there will be a mild departure from that hypothesis) join the game randomly according to a Bernoulli process. The problem solved here is that of computing their expected payoff as a function of time and the number of players present when they arrive, if the strategies are given. We consider both a finite horizon gam...

This paper shows for a class of differential games that the global Stackelberg equilibrium (GSE) coincides with feedback (FSE), although GSE assumes leader/regulator announces at initial time regulatory instrument rule she will follow rest game, while in FSE, regulator any chooses optimal level rate. coincidence is based on fact FSE calculated using dynamic programming what implies rate maximiz...

We study a non-cooperative game with aggregative structure, namely when the payoffs depend on the strategies of the opponent players through an aggregator function. We assume that a subset of players behave as leaders in a Stackelberg model. The leaders, as well the followers, act non-cooperatively between themselves and solve a Nash equilibrium problem. We assume an exogenous uncertainty affec...

While three deployed applications of game theory for security have recently been reported at AAMAS [12], we as a community remain in the early stages of these deployments; there is a continuing need to understand the core principles for innovative security applications of game theory. Towards that end, this paper presents PROTECT, a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States Coast Guar...

This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg problems. These are problems where the decisions or actions in successive layers of the hierarchy are taken in a sequential way while decisions or actions within each layer are taken in a simultaneous manner. There are m...

Algorithms for finding game-theoretic solutions are now used in several real-world security applications. This work has generally assumed a Stackelberg model where the defender commits to a mixed strategy first. In general two-player normal-form games, Stackelberg strategies are easier to compute than Nash equilibria, though it has recently been shown that in many security games, Stackelberg st...

This paper focuses on developing low-carbon technology (LCT) innovation in traditional enterprises under carbon trading policies. The Hamilton–Jacobi–Berman equation quantitatively investigates the coordination mechanism and optimal strategy of LCT systems conventional industries. A three-way dynamic differential game model is constructed to analyze three cases: Nash disequilibrium game; Stacke...