We examine the role of private information on impact vertical mergers. A merger can improve that is available to an upstream monopolist because, after merger, observe cost its downstream partner. In pre-merger world, because costs firms are information, has incomplete and cannot implement monopoly outcome: The expected equilibrium price product lower than price. After a input charged rival eith...

Environmental processes and biological community structures change along fluvial gradients within coastal river basins; the accumulation and associated risk of metal contamination would also be expected to change from upstream to downstream reaches. Speciation and degrees of contamination of metals in sediments from the upstream and downstream of river catchments of the southern Bohai Sea were ...

We analyze the effects of downstream firms’ acquisition of pure cash flow rights in an efficient upstream supplier when all firms compete in prices. With an acquisition, downstream firms internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals’ sales. Double marginalization is enhanced. Whereas full vertical integration would lead to decreasing, passive backwards ownership leads to increasing d...

We investigate the upstream and downstream product-market effects of a large sample of horizontal mergers and acquisitions from 1980 to 1997. We construct a data set that identifies the corporate customers, suppliers, and rivals of the firms initiating horizontal mergers and use this data set to examine announcement-related stock market revaluations and post-merger changes in operating performa...

The influence of firms’ ability to employ individualized pricing on the welfare consequences of horizontal mergers is examined in location models. In a two-to-one merger, the merger reduces consumer surplus more when firms can price discriminate based on individual preferences compared to when they cannot. However, the opposite holds true in a three-to-two merger, in which the reduction in cons...

We examine the effect of an oligopolistic upstream electronic market on upstream and downstream prices. The analysis highlights the two sources of competition that a firm that source from an electronic market (e-market firm) face: competition with less efficient firms that source traditionally (t-market firms) and competition among e-market firms. When size of the upstream e-market is small, th...