noses by using the equivalent axisymmetric body (EAB) theory. This Code has been developed by researchers and the results of it have been validated by the various flight tests results. In the case of non-zero angle of attack or asymmetric surface ablation for each meriodinal plane, the equivalent meriodinal plane (EMP) is created for any meriodinal plane. The combinations of these planes consti...

We study extreme Nash equilibria in the context of a selfish routing game. Specifically, we assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over m parallel identical links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic. In a Nash equilibrium, each user selfishly routes its traffic on those links that minimize its expected latency cost. T...

A network change is said to be irreversible if the initial network equilibrium cannot be restored by revoking the change. The phenomenon of irreversible network change has been observed in reality. To model this phenomenon, we develop a day-to-day dynamic model whose fixed point is a boundedly rational user equilibrium (BRUE) flow. Our BRUE based approach to modeling irreversible network change...

We study Nash equilibria in a discrete routing game that combines features of the two most famous models for non-cooperative routing, the KP model [16] and the Wardrop model [27]. In our model, users share parallel links. A user strategy can be any probability distribution over the set of links. Each user tries to minimize its expected latency, where the latency on a link is described by an arb...

Primary user emulation attack, which targets distabilizing the queuing dynamics of cognitive radio networks, is studied using game theoretic argument. The attack and defense are modeled as a stochastic game. The Nash equilibrium of the game is studied. In particular, the Lyapunov drift is considered as the reward in each round. Explicit expressions of the Nash equilibrium strategies are obtained.

Referring to additive demand models, the Stochastic User Equilibrium can be formulated in the reduced space of travel alternative generalized costs as a fixed point problem defined on R , where n is the number of travel alternatives minus the number of user classes. Through the analysis of an equivalent non-linear program, a new sufficient condition for the uniqueness of the solution to a gener...

We study Nash equilibria in a discrete routing game that combines features of the two most famous models for non-cooperative routing, the KP model [16] and the Wardrop model [27]. In our model, users share parallel links. A user strategy can be any probability distribution over the set of links. Each user tries to minimize its expected latency, where the latency on a link is described by an arb...