Recently Bramoulle and Kranton [2] presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other agents free ride. We examine the efficiency, effort and cost of specialized equilibria in comparison to other equilibria. Our main results show that the welf...

the objective of this study was to assess the adsorption potential of activated carbon (ac) asan adsorbent for the removal of murexide (mu) from aqueous solutions. the influence of variablesparameters including ph, amount of adsorbent, sieve size of adsorbent, temperature and contact timeon mu removal was studied. following optimization of variables, the relation between concentrations ofdye re...

We examine the coalition-proof equilibria of a participation game in a public good mechanism and study which Nash equilibria are achieved through the cooperative behavior of agents. The participation game may have multiple Nash equilibria, and various numbers of participants may be attained at the Nash equilibria. We provide sufficient conditions for the Nash equilibrium of the participation ga...

The screening of adsorbents (zeolites, MOFs, ACs, etc) requires the measurement adsorption equilibria and kinetics at milligram scale. In this regard, a volumetric apparatus (constant volume variable pressure – batch adsorber) has been developed for studying sorption. Its validation was accomplished by carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) nitrogen (N2) sorption CO2 on commercial binder-free 4A z...

In this paper, we will introduce the general concepts of generalized multiobjective game, generalized weight Nash equilibria and generalized Pareto equilibria. Next using the fixed point theorems due to Idzik [5] and Kim-Tan [6], we shall prove the existence theorems of generalized weight Nash equilibria under general hypotheses. And as applications of generalized weight Nash equilibria, we sha...

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and Whinston ([1]) prove that the action chosen in the coalition-proof equilibrium is e±cient. The coali...