In this paper we study the relationship that exists between ownership and governance structure of depository institutions (DI) on one side, and the dominant cause of failure on the other. Extant theory implies that while in stock owned DI where management is either well controled (through markets or board control) or interests are aligned with those of shareholders, the dominant cause of failur...

We consider an inspection game between an arbitrary number of polluting rms and an agency who can choose to monitor ambient pollution. We obtain an equilibrium where all rms comply with the same probability and where the inspection agency inspects all rms individually if ambient pollution exceeds an endogenous threshold. If the ne for noncompliance is high enough, the agency's costs are lower t...

We analyzed the effect of managerial ownership, leverage, and discretion on agency costs 14,719 Chilean companies. The results instrumental variables (IV) regressions indicate that ownership capital structure have a negative non-linear costs. Managerial concentration is an effective means internal control over costs, discarding entrenchment effect. impact debt suggests for high leverage levels,...

This paper deals with the economic analysis of hiring forms dedicated to managerial positions. Theoretical frames for corporate governance are based on agency theory. Crucial problems considered within agency theory are: information asymmetry, conflict of interests and supervision (monitoring) of management. Presented analysis covers also remuneration forms and manager’s participation in owners...