We introduce single-bid auctions as a new format for combinatorial auctions. In single-bid auctions, each bidder submits a single real-valued bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. Contrary to other simple auction formats, such as simultaneous or sequential single-item auctions, bidders can implement no-regret learning strategies for single-bid auctions in polynomial time. Price of an...

a r t i c l e i n f o JEL classification: D44 L71 Keywords: Oil and gas lease auctions Asymmetric information National oil company This paper analyzes bidding behavior in oil and gas tract auctions in Brazil, where the main winner has been Petrobras, a national company. We test predictions from the theory of common-value, first-price, sealed-bid auctions with asymmetric information. The tests i...

Auctions and elections are seemingly disjoint. Nevertheless, similar cryptographic primitives are used in both domains. For instance, mixnets, homomorphic encryption and trapdoor bit-commitments have been used by state-of-the-art schemes in both domains. These developments have appeared independently. For example, the adoption of mixnets in elections preceded a similar adoption in auctions by o...

One of the greatest contributions of e-comrnerce and online auctions is their ability to provide detailed bidding records in the form of a bid history. These data sources not only furnish dynamic information regarding the status of auctions, but also capture the essence of auction activities that was not accessible from live auctions. In this chapter, we explore three broad online auction issue...

auctions, eServices, agents, negotiation In this paper, we discuss the design of algorithms for agents to use when participating in multiple simultaneous English auctions, aiming to purchase multiple goods. Firstly, we present a coordination algorithm, which ensures the agent places appropriate bids in the different auctions to buy exactly the right number of goods. Secondly, we combine this wi...

This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Classic hotel auction design, a hybrid of sequential and simultaneous auctions. The problem of bidding in sequential auctions is formulated as an M...

Electronic market place plays an important intermediary role for connecting dealers and retail customers. The main aim of this paper is to design a value co-creation model in used-car auctions. More specifically, the study has been designed in order to describe the process of value co-creation in used-car auctions, to explore the co-created values in used-car auctions, and finally conclude the ...

ABSTRACT We tackle the problem of designing revenue maximizing auctions in the Bayesian framework, when bidders not only have private valuations but also private budgets. We consider the setting of selling divisible goods to multiple agents each with linear utilities, but agents cannot pay beyond their budget. We focus on the case when the auctioneer can check that bidders do not over-report th...

We discuss bundle auctions within the framework of an integer allocation problem. We show that for multi-unit auctions, of which bundle auctions are a special case, market equilibrium and constrained market equilibrium are equivalent concepts. This equivalence, allows us to obtain a computable necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of constrained market equilibrium for bundle auct...

Single-good ascending auctions, including the English Auction and its close variants (e.g. eBay), are the most widely used type of auction. Effective strategies for buyers and sellers in these auctions can have an enormous economic impact. We present a system that, relying on minimal assumptions, computes reserve prices for real-world ascending auctions by inferring the value distribution from ...