Spectrum rights have gained increasing attention since Ronald Coase pointed out that the most efficient way to assign spectrum is to give it to those users who value it most through property-like rights and secondary markets. Defining spectrum rights turns out to be difficult due to the nature of electronic emissions[1]. As a result, it may be more practical to define interference rights (simil...

This paper develops a model of bargaining over decision-rights between an uninformed principal and an informed but self-interested agent. The uninformed principal makes a price offer to the agent who then decides either to accept or to reject the offer. Contrary to the prediction the Coase Theorem provides, actions induced in the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium do not always satisfy ex-post...

We establish the bid-equivalence between an independent private-value (IPV) …rst-price auction model with resale and a model of …rst-price common-value auction, when the resale market satis…es a minimal ef…ciency property and the common value is de…ned by the transaction price. With an application of the Coase Theorem, we show two polar cases in which auctions with resale have opposite properti...

When should a buyer of an exhaustible resource move to a substitute if only the seller knows the exact size of the remaining resource stock? We characterize stationary dynamic signalling equilibrium of this Coasian bargaining problem, and find that adjustment delays in ending the relationship and the degree of asymmetric information shape the equilibrium outcome. The Coase conjecture —the infor...

I examine the Coasean independence property in a large multinational cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions, EU Emissions Trading System. analyze whether emissions of power producers are independent from allowance allocations by leveraging change allocation policy difference-in-difference strategy. The evidence suggests that holds overall and larger emitters firms respond to loss inc...

This paper studies corporate governance when a ̄rm faces imperfect competition. We derive ̄rms' decisions from utility maximisation by individuals. This reduces the usual monopoly distortion. We ̄nd that corporate governance can e®ect the equilibrium in the product (or input) markets. This enables us to endogenise the objective function of the ̄rm. If the ̄rm cannot commit not to change its con...

This paper draws on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1985, 1988, 1999) to examine hotel outsourcing. The study focuses on the uncertainty and frequency attributes, two of three activity attributes that TCE theorists see as affecting the propensity to outsource. Findings relating to the third TCE activity attribute, asset specificity, are reported in Lamminmaki (...

This is an essay in postclassical theory and modelling, and more specifically an attempt to think about organisation and management. Our focus is on cognition and communication, not on objectivity or causality. We look for operations based on distinctions and their contexts, not for identities, forces, causes and effects (see Korzybski 1933; Bateson 1972; von Foerster 2003; Luhmann 1984; Baecke...