This paper examines the implications of network externalities on equilibrium outcomes in a differentiated products duopoly under strategic managerial delegation through relative performance based incentive contracts. It shows that Miller and Pazgal (2001)'s equivalence result does not go through in the presence of network externalities. Instead, Singh and Vives (1984)'s rankings of equilibrium ...

ess as: A ciety (20 and host s.2014.0 Abstract This paper analyzes the dynamics of a Cournot duopoly model with different strategies. We offer results on existence, stability and local bifurcations of the equilibrium points. The bifurcation diagrams and Lyapunov exponents of the model are presented to show that the model behaves chaotically with the variation in the parameters. The state variab...

This paper shows that subsidy can naturally emerge as part of the equilibrium strategy of an innovator of a cost-reducing innovation in a Cournot oligopoly when the innovator is endowed with combinations of upfront fee and royalty. It is further shown that there are robust regions where the social welfare is higher in subsidy-based licensing compared to the regime where licensing involving subs...

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently ...

We establish the existence results for the Allaz–Vila [B. Allaz, J.-L. Vila, Cournot competition, forward markets and efficiency, J. Econ. Theory 59 (1993) 1–16] forward market equilibrium model when the M producers have different linear cost functions. We also consider an example with three asymmetric producers. The computational results supplement the conclusion in that the forward trading wo...

Strategic Trade Policy and the Home Bias in Firm Ownership Structure by Steffen Huck and Kai A. Konrad In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full indigenis...

We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal cost compete à la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and total demand, we first identify all combinations equilibrium consumer surplus industry profit that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, fix the average above (i.e., first‐best surplus) possible ...

this work, we investigate a Cournot-Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation between two different firms, where one company uses price as decision variable and the other quantity. The stability of Nash equilibrium point is investigated, role parameters on studied. It shown that system experiences three types bifurcations when go through boundary curves region. Furthermore, model's bi...

Market Structure and the Demand for Free Trade ABSTRACT We explore the interplay of market structure and government trade policy in the context of a heterogenous goods duopoly model (allowing for goods to be substitutes or complements) wherein governments simultaneously and noncooperatively choose whether or not to provide subsidies for their firms and then firms noncooperatively choose output ...