This paper describes a study of agent bidding strategies, assuming combinatorial valuations for complementary and substitutable goods, in three auction environments: sequential auctions, simultaneous auctions, and the Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Classic hotel auction design, a hybrid of sequential and simultaneous auctions. The problem of bidding in sequential auctions is formulated as an M...

With the actual situation of bidding rigging in engineering construction areas, this article analyze the motivation of bidding rigging and use the game theory to discuss the possibility of the bidding rigging under different bidding rules; thus suggest the lowest price bid for simple construction projects and lower price bid+ comprehensive evaluation bid for complicated engineering cases. Final...

An anonymous bidding protocol without any reliable center for a small community is proposed. The anonymity of a bidding protocol means that the participation of everyone involved in the bidding except for the successful bidder is kept secret. Since it is hard for a small community to establish a reliable center owing to the difficulty and cost of doing so, an anonymous bidding protocol without ...

Shill bidding is where spurious bids are introduced into an auction to drive up the final price for the seller, thereby defrauding legitimate bidders. Trevathan and Read presented an algorithm to detect the presence of shill bidding in online auctions. The algorithm observes bidding patterns over a series of auctions, and gives each bidder a shill score to indicate the likelihood that they are ...

Traditional auction theory assumes that bidders possess values defined solely on the auctioned object. There may, however, be cases in which bidders possess preferences over the revenue achieved by the auctioneer. We present here a comprehensive framework of price preference valuations, unifying several phenomenon ranging from preference for charitable giving to shill bidding. We compare expect...

Online media offers opportunities to marketers to deliver brand messages to a large audience. Advertising technology platforms enables the advertisers to find the proper group of audiences and deliver ad impressions to them in real time. The recent growth of the real time bidding has posed a significant challenge on monitoring such a complicated system. With so many components we need a reliabl...

Recent work in experimental economics has raised that observed behavior depends on whether wealth was windfall or earned. This paper extends this work by considering whether earned wealth a ects bidding behavior in an induced-value second-price auction. We nd people bid more sincerely in the auction with earned wealth given monetary incentives; earned wealth did not induce sincere bidding in hy...

When bidders are not substitutes, we show that there is no standard ascending auction that implements a bidder-optimal competitive equilibrium under truthful bidding. Such an impossibility holds also in environments where the Vickrey payoff vector is a competitive equilibrium payoff and is thus stronger than de Vries, Schummer and Vohra’s [On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects...