We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that a strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve his payoff by changing his strategy unilaterally. In the setting of incentive and leader eq...

We consider games of strategic substitutes and strategic complements on networks. We introduce two different evolutionary dynamics in order to refine their multiplicity of equilibria, and we analyse the system through a mean field approach. We find that for the best-shot game, taken as a model for substitutes, a replicator-like dynamics does not lead to Nash equilibria, whereas it leads to uniq...

A recent study on axisymmetric ideal magnetohydrodynamic equilibria with incompressible flows [H. Tasso and G. N. Throumoulopoulos, Phys. Plasmas 5, 2378 (1998)] is extended to the generic case of helically symmetric equilibria with incompressible flows. It is shown that the equilibrium states of the system under consideration are governed by an elliptic partial differential equation for the he...

General equilibrium models generically are determinate and have a finite number of equilibria. But, with linear activities and some inelastically supplied factors of production, the economies that arise endogenously as perfect-foresight equilibria proceed through time can robustly be indeterminate. During the initial period of an intertemporal model, the perfect-foresight equilibria typically a...

Boolean games are a compact and expressive class of games, based on propositional logic. However, Boolean games are computationally complex: checking for the existence of pure Nash equilibria in Boolean games is Σp2-complete, and it is co-NP-complete to check whether a given outcome for a Boolean game is a pure Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we consider two possible avenues to tractability in...

We survey and discuss several solution concepts for infinite turn-based multiplayer games with qualitative (i.e. win-lose) objectives of the players. These games generalise in a natural way the common model of games in verification which are two-player, zero-sum games with ω-regular winning conditions. The generalisation is in two directions: our games may have more than two players, and the ob...

In this paper we consider a supply function model of an electricity market where strategic firms have capacity constraints. We show that if firms have heterogeneous cost functions and capacity constraints then the differential equation approach to finding the equilibrium supply function may not be effective by itself because it produces supply functions that fail to be non-decreasing. Even when...

We construct a model to capture the Keynesian idea that production and employment decisions are based on expectations of aggregate demand driven by sentiments, and that realized demand follows from the production and employment decisions of firms. We cast the Keynesian idea into a simple model with imperfect information about aggregate demand and we characterize the rational expectations equili...

In this paper the non-canonical Hamiltonian dynamics of a gyrostat in the three body problem will be examined. By means of geometric-mechanics methods some relative equilibria of the dynamics of a gyrostat in Newtonian interaction with two rigid bodies will be studied. Taking advantage of the results obtained in previous papers, working on the reduced problem, the bifurcations of these relative...

Do competitive insurance markets function orderly in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection? What are the properties of allocations attainable as competitive equilibria of such economies? And in particular, are competitive equilibria incentive efficient? The fundamental contribution on competitive markets for insurance contracts is Prescott and Townsend (1984). They analyze Walrasia...