s: Speakers should submit abstracts on the easy-to-use interactive Web form. No knowledge of LATEX isnecessary to submit an electronic form, although those who useLATEX may submitabstracts with such coding, and all math displays and similarily coded material (such as accent marks in text) must be typeset inLATEX. Visit www.ams.org/cgi-bin/abstracts/abstract.pl/ . Questio...

Colman, Pulford, and Lawrence, in the current issue of this journal, present theory and data to advance a psychologically informed approach to game theory. While supporting their project, I respond to their critique of projection theory, question their overly flexible way of evaluating alternative proposals, and note that two of these alternatives, team reasoning and Stackelberg reasoning, cann...

We consider the problem of peer selection for multimedia transmission over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network to find a strategy model for peer selection for each lost packet. Our problem consists of two parts one related to the P2P network that is a peer selection method, and the other is related to the uplink bandwidth that each peer in the network receives from a licensed spectrum holder. Moreover...

* The figures in Sections VII and IX were created using Dynamo [184] and VirtualLabs [92], respectively. I am grateful to Caltech for its hospitality as I completed this article, and I gratefully acknowledge financial support under NSF Grant SES-0617753.

Ever since Darwin read Malthus, the theory of evolution has benefited from the interaction of ecology with economics. Evolutionary game theory belongs to this tradition: it merges population ecology with game theory. Game theory originally addressed problems confronted by decision makers with diverging interests (for instance, firms competing for a market). The ‘players’ have to choose between ...

A two person zerosum game is of the form 〈{1, 2}, S1, S2, u1,−u1〉. Note that when a player tries to maximize her payoff, she is also simultaneously minimizing payoff of the other player. For this reason, these games are also called strictly competitive games. Player 1 is usually called the row player and player 2 is called the column player . Let S1 = {s11, s12, . . . , s1m} and S2 = {s21, s22,...

We present a distribution-free model of incomplete-information games, both with and without private information, in which the players use a robust optimization approach to contend with payoff uncertainty. Our “robust game” model relaxes the assumptions of Harsanyi’s Bayesian game model, and provides an alternative distribution-free equilibrium concept, which we call “robust-optimization equilib...