Methyl eugenol (ME) and cue-lure (C-L) traps to detect tephritid flies on the U.S. mainland were tested with and without insecticides under Hawaiian weather conditions against small populations of oriental fruit fly, Bactrocera dorsalis (Hendel) and melon fly, Bactrocera cucurbitae (Coquillett), respectively. In comparative tests, standard Jackson traps with naled and the Hawaii fruit fly areaw...

We consider open Jackson networks with losses with mixed finite and infinite queues and analyze the efficiency of sampling from their exact stationary distribution. We show that perfect sampling is possible, although the underlying Markov chain may have an infinite state space. The main idea is to use a Jackson network with infinite buffers (that has a product form stationary distribution) to b...

We conducted the research of sharp inequalities Jackson type in $L_2$ space for approximation by entire functions exponential type.

This note adds one celebrated coalition formation game due to Gamson (1961) in the list of applications of the theory of hedonic games explored by Banerjee, Konishi and Somnez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). We apply their results to study the original Gamson game and o er extensions both to a multi-dimensional characteristics space and to an in nite number of players. JEL Classi ca...

We develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors. Our model combines then different aspects of the connections model and the co-author model and can be seen as a degree and distance-based model with both negative and positive externalities. Consider a si...

Using Jackson's q-derivative and the q-Stirling numbers, we establish some transformation theorems leading to the values of some convergent q-series.

E. N. Carabateas J. A. Fay S. I. Freedman G. N. Hatsopoulos W. D. Jackson H. P. Meissner P. L. Penfield, Jr. D. C. Pridmore-Brown A. H. Shapiro J. L. Smith, Jr. H. H. Woodson Coggins Cooper F. W. Fraim III N. Gothard C. W. Haldeman H. M. Heggestad W. H. Heiser J. B. Heywood E. D. Hoag P. G. Katona F. D. Ketterer G. B. Kliman P. Klimowski A. G. F. Kniazzeh M. F. Koskinen W. H. Levison A. T. Lewi...

We study dominant strategy implementation especially in economic environments. Wefirst show that in general environments, strategy-proofness and quasi-strong-non-bossiness together are necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementation via the associated direct revelationmechanism. Wenext prove that in weak separable environments, strategy-proofness is sufficient for dominant strateg...