We propose a semi–structural discrete–choice model that can be used to estimate static or dynamic decision rules. It is particularly useful in strategic contexts when games involve a rich set of choices, when private information is correlated, and when one wants to uncover the effect of historic behavior (on, for example, prices, sales, and profits). We apply our discrete–choice estimator to st...

This article reinterprets, under a common framework, previous results on location choice under delivered pricing. The paper clearly identifies the economic forces which explain why the socially optimal locations are an equilibrium of the location-price game in some models, and why they are not an equilibrium in other models. The paper shows that the rationale behind Hamilton et al. (Reg Sci Urb...

We study the influence of minimum quality standards in a two-region partial-equilibrium model of vertical product differentiation and trade. Three alternative standard setting arrangements are considered: Full Harmonization, National Treatment and Mutual Recognition. The analysis integrates the choice of a particular standard setting alternative by governments into the model. We provide a set o...

In this paper, an infinitely-repeated Bertrand game is considered. The model has a two-tier relationship; two firms make a self-enforced collusive agreement and each firm writes a law-enforced contract to its privately-informed agent. The main finding is that in optimal collusion, interaction between intra-firm (internal) contracting and inter-firm collusion may be exploited; inter-firm collusi...

Firms often have imperfect information about demand for their products. We develop an integrated econometric and theoretical framework to model firm demand assessment and subsequent pricing decisions with limited information. We introduce a panel data discrete choice model whose realistic assumptions about consumer behavior deliver partially identified preferences and thus generates ambiguity i...

We analyse the subgame perfect equilibrium of a four stage game in a model of vertical product di erentiation, where the consumer's evaluation of a product depends on its inherent quality and on its network's size. First, two rms choose their product's inherent quality. Then they may mutually agree on providing an adapter before competing in prices. Finally, consumers buy. We nd that, despite t...

We propose a simple model of wage dispersion arising from oligopsonistic competition in the labor market. Our model has workers who are equally able but who have heterogeneous preferences for non-wage characteristics, while employers have heterogeneous productivity characteristics. We completely and explicitly solve for the equilibrium wage distribution and show that “inside” and “outside” forc...

We use laboratory experiments to examine the effect of firm size asymmetry on price leadership in a capacity constrained duopoly. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium of our duopoly game predicts that the large firm is the price leader. In the experiment, although price leadership by the large firm is frequently observed, behavior deviates significantly from the model’s prediction. Both small...

We examine how vertical separation affects the lobbying activities for the access charge of essential facilities. First, when investigating a model where the number of new entrants is fixed, we find that vertical separation either increases or decreases the access charge, and that this depends on the relative efficiency between the incumbent and the new entrants, and the number of entrants. Sec...

We use experimental methods to demonstrate the anti-competitive potential of price matching guarantees in both symmetric and asymmetric cost duopolies. Our findings establish that when costs are symmetric, price-matching guarantees significantly increase market prices. In markets with cost asymmetries, guaranteed prices remain high relative to prices without the use of guarantees, but the overa...