Recently, XACML is a popular access control policy language that is used widely in many applications. Policies in XACML are built based on many components over distributed resources. Due to the expressiveness of XACML, it is not trivial for policy administrators to understand the overall effect and consequences of XACML policies they have written. In this paper we show a mechanism and a tool ho...

Proving software free of security bugs is hard. Programming language support to ensure that programs correctly enforce their security policies would help, but, to date, no language has the ability to verify the enforcement of the kinds of policies used in practice— dynamic, stateful policies which address a broad range of concerns including forms of access control and information flow tracking....

Title of dissertation: Language-based Enforcement of User-defined Security Policies As Applied to Multi-tier Web Programs Nikhil Swamy, Doctor of Philosophy, 2008 Directed by: Professor Michael Hicks Department of Computer Science Over the last 35 years, researchers have proposed many different forms of security policies to control how information is managed by software, e.g., multi-level infor...

The security goals of an organization are implemented through security policies, which concern physical security, digital security and security awareness. An insider is aware of these security policies, and might be able to thwart the security goals without violating any policies, by combining physical, digital and social means. This paper presents the Portunes model, a model for describing and...

Proving software free of security bugs is hard. Languages that ensure that programs correctly enforce their security policies would help, but, to date, no security-typed language has the ability to verify the enforcement of the kinds of policies used in practice—dynamic, stateful policies which address a range of concerns including forms of access control and information flow tracking. This pap...

This paper describes the design of LoPSiL, a language for specifying location-dependent security and privacy policies. Policyspecification languages like LoPSiL are domain-specific programming languages intended to simplify the tasks of specifying and enforcing sound security policies on untrusted (i.e., potentially insecure) software. As far as we are aware, LoPSiL is the first imperative poli...

Language use and creative writing go hand in hand. In the process of exploring language, we also engage in the study of literature. An engagement with literature is, indeed, a continuing process of improving our capacity to use language and refining our sensibility to good language use. In Kenya, there are clearly discernible patterns of creative writing which may be linked to language policies...

In this paper we address the main questions associated with delegations and the role they play in security architectures for distributed systems; why they are required and how they can be implemented. In distributed and dynamic systems like the Semantic Web or pervasive computing environments, describing comprehensive policies in terms of every possible resource and user is not always possible ...

Organizations’ authorization policies are usually described by access control rules enforced on each protected object scattered all over the organization. Having a single global security policy specification would promote both security clarity and coherency [4, 9, 18, 31, 37]. Having a single security model for the whole organization, a single point of management and enforcement with a innumero...