We study optimal equilibria in multi-player games. An equilibrium is optimal for a player, if her payoff is maximal. A tempting approach to solving this problem is to seek optimal Nash equilibria, the standard form of equilibria where no player has an incentive to deviate from her strategy. We argue that a player with the power to define an equilibrium is in a position, where she should not be ...

Applicant: Svetlana Obraztsova Home institution: Hebrew University of Jerusalem Home country: Israel Host:Edith Elkind Host institution: University of Oxford Host country: United Kingdom Dates: 09-03-2016 to 20-03-2016 During my visit to University of Oxford I closely worked with my host, Prof. Elkind. Our main discussion was about Trembling Hand equilibria for Voting games, precisely, to Votin...

This paper develops theoretical foundations for an error analysis of approximate equilibria in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with heterogeneous agents and incomplete financial markets. While there are several algorithms which compute prices and allocations for which agents’ first order conditions are approximately satisfied (‘approximate equilibria’), there are few results on ho...

Hydrochemistry and isotopes are studied for characterizations of geothermal waters, groundwaters, surface waters in Leizhou Peninsula (LZ) the northern part Hainan Island (HN) across tensile-tectonic Qiongzhou Strait, southern China. Water chemistry results showed that most alkaline HCO3-Na types, while shallow groundwater samples were significantly different with HCO3-Ca, HCO3-Mg, HNO3-Ca type...

The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equilibria of stochastic games. GLOBAL NEWTON METHOD FOR STOCHASTIC GAMES SRIHARI GOVINDAN AND ROBERT WILSON Abstract. The Global Newton Method for games in normal form and in extensive form is shown to have a natural extension to computing Markov-perfect equi...

We revisit the model of Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006) but under the assumption that risk-dominant equilibria are Pareto efficient. It is found that risk-dominant equilibria, non-risk-dominant equilibria and some non-monomorphic states can emerge in the long run when players interact with their immediate neighbors only.