We study the design of truthful auction mechanisms for maximizing the seller’s profit. We focus on the case when the auction mechanism does not have any knowledge of bidders’ valuations, especially of their upper bound. For the Single-Item auction, we obtain an “asymptotically” optimal scheme: for any k ∈ Z and ǫ > 0, we give a randomized truthful auction that guarantees an expected profit of Ω...

Pricing is considered a relevant way to control congestion and differentiate services in communication networks. Among all pricing schemes, auctioning for bandwidth has received a lot of attention. We aim in this paper at comparing a recently designed auction scheme called multi-bid auction with the often referenced progressive second price auction. We especially focus on the case of a stochast...

Consider a firm that satisfies its demand for a specified time period by assigning it to a supplier via a procurement (reverse) auction; call this the standard auction. The firm is considering first breaking the demand down into smaller time periods and permitting bids for one or more of these sub-periods, either as independent bids or as package bids; call this the unbundled auction. Choosing ...

The deregulation of the electricity industry in many countries has created a number of marketplaces in which producers and consumers can operate in order to more effectively manage and meet their energy needs. To this end, this paper develops a new model for electricity retail where end-use customers choose their supplier from competing electricity retailers. The model is based on simultaneous ...

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid multi–unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending–bid multi–unit auctions. In part...

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending–bid multi– unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending–bid multi–unit auctions. In par...

Herding behavior is widely observed in auctions. There are rational reasons for herding but herding can also be counterproductive. We found evidence of herding behavior and sub-optimal outcome in a multi-winner auction setting. This study adds to the knowledge of herding by looking at herding in an auction setting where there is extra incentive to herd (multi-winner auction). Our findings recon...

Technological progress has led to electronic exchanges attracting a major part of transaction volume for standardized stocks. In the field of derivatives and bonds, electronic exchanges failed to prosper and so called over-the-counter (OTC) trading is predominant: possibly because multi-attribute assets are hard to trade in structured two-sided markets. The present paper aims at alleviating thi...