Plasmids carry a wide range of genes that are often involved in bacterial social behaviour. The question of why such genes are frequently mobile has received increasing attention. Here, we use an explicit population genetic approach to model the evolution of plasmid-borne bacterial public goods production. Our findings highlight the importance of both transmission and relatedness as factors dri...

Recent work on public goods contributions has examined the relationship between gender and free-riding behavior in studies using laboratory public goods. This research furthers this line of inquiry by examining gender as a possible explanation of hypothetical bias, which occurs in valuation studies using real world public goods. Results show that gender differences exist in hypothetical valuati...

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes. JEL Classification: A...

Controversy remains over the degree of hypothetical bias in contingent valutation method (CVM) estimates of values for public goods, especially for public goods with significant passive-use values. This paper uses an “indifferent voter” approach to calibrate stated WTP for a proposed public good increase with actual WTP implied by voting and tax liability data. Our data are from a CVM survey an...

This paper develops a test for Pareto-elliciency in the local public sector using the analytical result that aggregate property value is maximized at the public output level which satisfies the Samuelson condition for efficiency. By using cross-section data, it is possible to deduce whether a representative community provides its public goods in a property-value-maximizing (and hence efficient)...

Bergstrom showed that a necessary condition for a Pareto optimum with non-paternalistic altruism is classification as a selfish Pareto optimum. This paper shows that Bergstrom’s result does not generalize to the benefit-cost analysis of generic changes in public goods. There may exist good projects that will be rejected by a selfish-benefit cost test, a selfish test error. Selfish test error is...

We test if confusion and learning could potentially explain all the decay of contributions in the repeated public goods games by implementing a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion. A comparison shows that the rate of decline is more than twice as high in a standard public goods game. Furthermore, we find that simple learning cannot generate the contribution dynamics,...

This paper deals with the concept of a semi-public good. These semi-public goods are characterized by the fact that their use is being supplemented by specific private goods. The consumption of this complementary private good is constrained by an individual quantity constraint for each individual agent. The quantity constraints depend on the level of the semi-public good. For instance, car driv...