Generic systems for the analysis of logic programs have been proposed over the last decade or so. Considerable progress has been made in terms of frameworks, algorithms, abstract domains and implementations. A number of generic top-down procedural frameworks are widely available. However, implementation e orts for bottom-up declarative frameworks are in a preliminary stage. In this thesis we de...

A rational agent derives its choice of action from its beliefs and goals. Goals can be distinguished into achievement goals and maintenance goals. The aim of this paper is to define a mechanism which ensures the satisfaction of maintenance goals. We argue that such a mechanism requires the agent to look ahead, in order to make sure that the execution of actions does not lead to a violation of a...

In this paper we consider the problem of optimizing the ' H Z norm, while keeping the L1 norms of some other transfer functions under specified levels. We show that the optimal closed-loop impulse responses of transfer functions in the constraints have finite support, and thus nonrational Laplace transforms. To solve the difficulty of implementing non-rational controllers, we propose a method f...

In this note we consider the following high-order rational difference equation xn = 1+ k ∏ i=1 (1− xn−i ) k ∑ i=1 xn−i , n = 0, 1, . . . , where k ≥ 3 is odd number, x−k , x−k+1, x−k+2, . . . , x−1 is positive numbers. We obtain the boundedness of positive solutions for the above equation, and with the perturbation of initial values, we mainly use the transformation method to prove that the pos...

Mechanism design theory strongly relies on the concept of Nash equilibrium. However, studies of experimental games show that Nash equilibria are rarely played and that subjects may be thinking only a finite number of iterations. We study one of the most influential benchmarks of mechanism design theory, the expected externality mechanism (D’Aspremont, GerardVaret, 1979) in a finite-depth enviro...

Probabilism is committed to two theses: 1) Opinion comes in degrees—call them degrees of belief, or credences. 2) The degrees of belief of a rational agent obey the probability calculus. Correspondingly, a natural way to argue for probabilism is: i) to give an account of what degrees of belief are,

the purpose of this study is to present an approximate numerical method for solving high order linear fredholm-volterra integro-differential equations in terms of rational chebyshev functions under the mixed conditions. the method is based on the approximation by the truncated rational chebyshev series. finally, the effectiveness of the method is illustrated in several numerical examples. the p...

We study the behaviour of rational agents in exchange protocols which rely on trustees. We allow malicious parties to compromise the trustee by paying a cost and, thereby, present a game analysis that advocates exchange protocols which induce balanced risks on the participants. We also present a risk-balanced protocol for fair confidential secret comparison.