We construct an optimizing-agent model of a closed economy which is simple enough that we can use it to make exact utility calculations. There is a stabilization problem because there are one-period nominal contracts for wages, or prices, or both and shocks that are unknown at the time when contracts are signed. We evaluate alternative monetary policy rules using the utility function of the rep...

the two parts of a lease contract cannot always assign the period of lease. sometimes it isn't mentioned any period in contract but they assert the smallest unit of time for assignment of the rental. therefore the civil low makes reputable the lease contracts that the period of rent is left unsaid in them for the same smallest unit of time. in 'spite of that the legal spirit of this a...

there are rare references to professional training in mesopotamian sources mainly because this used to be done in the family, from father to son. nevertheless, there are some 35 apprenticeship contracts from the neo-babylonian period which open a unique window to the social, legal and economic aspects of professional training. the present article edits and translates 3 such apprenticeship contr...

The use of formal contracts has long been advocated as an approach to develop programs that are provably correct. However, the reality is that adoption of contracts has been slow in practice. Despite this, the adoption of lightweight contracts — typically utilising runtime checking — has progressed. In the case of Java, built-in features of the language (e.g. assertions and exceptions) can be u...

Production contracts have gained significant popularity as a mechanism of vertical coordication in several agricultural industries. However, the compensation received from such contracts does not always satisfy the grower’s optimal compensation strategy. Furthermore, these contracts are non-adjustable over the contract term although a grower’s risk position often does change. This analysis illu...

There is growing interest in the use of loss contracts that offer performance incentives as upfront payments that employees can lose. Standard behavioral models predict a tradeoff in the use of loss contracts: employees will work harder under loss contracts than under gain contracts; but, anticipating loss aversion, they will prefer gain contracts to loss contracts. In a series of experiments, ...

Standard economic models of contract imply that contracts should be highly “complex,” by which we mean (1) rich in the expected number of payoff-relevant contingencies; (2) variable in the magnitude of payoffs contracted to flow between parties; and (3) severe in the cognitive load necessary to understand the contract. Yet most realworld contracts are simple along all three of these dimensions....