We analyze the security of a fingerprinting scheme proposed at IWDW 2005. We show two results, namely that this scheme (1) does not provide seller security : a dishonest buyer can repudiate the fact that he redistributed a content, and (2) does not provide buyer security : a buyer can be framed by a malicious seller.

This document contains a number of omitted proofs and a more "formal" proof of the main theorem of the paper "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms." 1. Omitted and Detailed Proofs for the Case that T = 2 Proof of Proposition 2 Step 1 We start by proving existence of the solution of the seller’s problem when T = 1. The seller seeks to solve

In a second-price auction with costly bidding, bidders can deter others from participating by publicly pre-committing to bid. Such “bid deterrence” increases total welfare when the reserve price is given, but allows the seller to increase expected revenue when the seller can pre-commit to a reserve price. JEL Codes: D44.

This paper presents new multi-agent negotiation models for electronic commerce. These models address M-N-P negotiation problems, i.e. negotiations between m buyers and n sellers for buying p dependent products or services. These products or services are not necessarily provided by the same seller. We propose two new negotiation protocols as well as algorithms describing the behaviors of seller ...

As is the case with traditional markets, the sellers on the Internet do not usually know the demand functions of their customers. However, in such a digital environment, a seller can experiment different prices in order to maximize his profits. In this paper, we develop a dynamic pricing model to solve the pricing problem of a Web-store, where seller sets a fixed price and buyer either accepts ...

We study a dynamic Bayesian persuasion framework in a finite horizon setting consisting of a Seller and a Buyer. The Seller wishes to persuade the Buyer to buy a durable good at a given price by providing information about its relevance (match quality). The Buyer has private information about his valuation for a good match and we study optimal dynamic information policies employed by the Seller...

With the improvement of China's Internet penetration and a shift in consumption consciousness, user scale and market size of online trading reached a new height, and C2C e-commerce has the most rapid development. As the seller and buyer of online transaction in a state of isolation in time and space, there is serious information asymmetry. So the reputation problems that exist in the online tra...

T paper analyzes sequential auctioning of single units of an indivisible good to a fluctuating population composed of overlapping generations of unit-demand bidders. Two phenomena emergent in such a market are investigated: forward-looking bidding strategies, and closed-loop selling strategies that involve learning from past prices. The buyers shade their bids down, i.e., bid less than they wou...

A seller in an online marketplace with an effective reputation mechanism should expect that dishonest behavior results in higher payments now, while honest behavior results in higher reputation—and thus higher payments—in the future. We study two widely used classes of reputation mechanisms. First, we show that weighting all past ratings equally gives sellers an incentive to falsely advertise. ...

The enhanced abilities of online retailers to learn about their customers’ shopping behavior have increased fears of dynamic pricing, a practice in which a seller sets prices based on the estimated buyer’s willingness-to-pay. However, among online retailers, a deviation from a one-price-for-all policy is the exception. When price discrimination is observed, it is often in the context of custome...