When major investors own shares in multiple firms in the same industry, the cross ownership changes competitive interests and moves the equilibrium closer to the monopoly solution. In the presence of cross ownership, the traditional measure of industry concentration, the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, fails to accurately reflect the level of competition in the market. We extend the literature on c...

We present a Solow-type growth model without constant returns. The population is heterogeneous with respect to capital per head, rate of saving, depreciation, and growth. We employ a continuous version of the Shapley value to divide total output among the di¤erent groups. In contrast to the standard Solow model, or its endogenous growth manifestation (labelled AK-type growth models), there may ...

Using a new representation theorem for additive cost sharing methods as sums of path methods, we show that many of the standard additive cost sharing methods (Aumann-Shapley, Shapley Shubik, and Serial Cost) are consistent. These results follow directly from a simple su cient condition for consistency: being generated by associative paths, which can be used to show consistency for many other me...

We study the cost sharing problem for cooperative games in situations where the cost function C is not available via oracle queries, but must instead be learned from samples drawn from a distribution, represented as tuples (S,C(S)), for different subsets S of players. We formalize this approach, which we call STATISTICAL COST SHARING, and consider the computation of the core and the Shapley val...

New results on a class of distributed two-sided matching algorithms are described. In particular, these algorithms can dominate the matches produced by the Gale-Shapley algorithm in terms of both average social welfare and fairness. However, stability is not guaranteed and therefore a natural tradeoff arises between stability and social welfare. At one extreme, stability is ‘purchased’ in Gale-...

In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hamiache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value ...

We present new radial velocities for 306 bright (R < 16) galaxies in a 77 deg 2 region of the Shapley supercluster measured with the FLAIR-II spectrograph on the UK Schmidt Telescope. The galaxies we measured were uniformly distributed over the survey area in contrast to previous samples which were concentrated in several rich Abell clusters. Most of the galaxies (230) were members of the Shapl...

We …rst scrutinize two extensions of the nucleolus for NTU games by Kalai(1975) and Nakayama(1983) ; respectively. We see that some nice things disappear during the process of extension. To de…ne the -nucleolus, the -excess function is de…ned and is axiomatized. It is nice to see that the -nucleolus satis…es the coincidence property and preserves many nice properties of the nucleolus for TU gam...

We consider the Shapley-Scarf house allocation problem where monetary transfers are allowed. We characterize the class of mechanisms that are strategy-proof, ex post individually rational, ex post budget balanced, and “collusion-proof.” In these mechanisms, the price of each object is fixed in advance, and the objects are reallocated according to the (unique) core assignment of the Shapley-Scar...