Philosophers disagree. A lot. Pervasive disagreement is part of the territory; consensus hard to find. Some think this should lead us embrace philosophical skepticism: skepticism about extent which we can know, or justifiably believe, views defend and advance. Most philosophers in literature fall into one camp other: anti-skepticism. Drawing on insights hinge epistemology, paper proposes anothe...

Efforts to internalize data sharing in research practice have been driven largely by developing international norms that have not incorporated opinions from researchers in lowand middle-income countries. We sought to identify the issues around ethical data sharing in the context of research involving women and children in urban India. We interviewed researchers, managers, and research participa...

The arguments of Fodor, Garrett, Walker and Parkes [(1980) Against definitions, Cognition, 8, 263-367] are the source of widespread skepticism in cognitive science about lexical semantic structure. Whereas the thesis that lexical items, and the concepts they express, have decompositional structure (i.e. have significant constituents) was at one time “one of those ideas that hardly anybody [in t...

Skeptical theists purport to undermine evidential arguments from evil by appealing to the fact that our knowledge of goods, evils, and their interconnections is signi cantly limited. Michael J. Almeida and Graham Oppy have recently argued that skeptical theism is unacceptable because it results in a form of moral skepticism which rejects inferences that play an important role in our ordinary mo...

In Mind and World, McDowell conceives of the content of perceptual experiences as conceptual. This picture is supposed to provide a therapy for skepticism, by showing that empirical thinking is objectively and normatively constrained. The paper offers a reconstruction of McDowell’s view and shows that the therapy fails. This claim is based on three arguments: 1) the identity conception of truth...

Swartzer concludes the paper with the claim that desert is not a basic normative notion. It cannot “supply first principles of justice.” (p. 1) In other words, desert is to be defined in terms of justice, not the other way around. What we deserve just is what we are to receive according to the demands of justice. On this view, to say that a just distribution of goods is such that everyone recei...

A key feature of communication with evidence is skepticism: to the extent possible, a receiver will attribute any incomplete disclosure to the sender concealing unfavorable evidence. The degree of skepticism depends on how much evidence the sender is expected to possess. I characterize when a change in the prior distribution of evidence induces more skepticism, i.e. induces any receiver to take...