We model how excess demand or excess supply can be generated in the presence of a social network of interactions, where agents are subject to external information and individual incentives. In this context we study price fluctuations in financial markets under equilibrium. In particular, we isolate the role of these different factors in the determination of price fluctuations and describe non t...

The use of social sanctions against behaviour which contradicts a set of informal rules is often an important element in the functioning of informal institutions in traditional societies. In the social sciences, sanctioning behaviour has often been explained in terms of the internalisation of norms that prescribe the sanctions (e.g. Parsons 1951) or the threat of new sanctions against those who...

In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the heterogeneous side depends on the structured network. We explore four well-used structures of networks and define the social circle by the distance between each c...

In this paper, we address the selfish bin covering problem, which is greatly related both to the bin covering problem, and to the weighted majority game. What we are mainly concerned with is howmuch the lack of central coordination harms social welfare. Besides the standard PoA and PoS, which are based on Nash equilibrium, we also take into account the strong Nash equilibrium, and several new e...

This paper shows the existence of a collateral equilibrium without assuming any hypotheses on the strict positivity, be they individual initial endowments, including the ex post initial endowments, or aggregated initial endowments. Because of dropping the strict positivity of social initial endowment we fail to get an equilibrium. Instead, we get a quasi-equilibrium. Then, appealing to the conc...

A well—known result from the theory of finitely repeated games states that if the stage game has a unique equilibrium, then there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the finitely repeated game in which the equilibrium of the stage game is being played in every period. Here I show that this result does in general not hold anymore if players have social preferences of the form frequently a...

We study Nash equilibrium in two-settlement competitive electricity markets with horizontal market power, flow congestion, demand uncertainties and probabilistic system contingencies. The equilibrium is formulated as a stochastic Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (EPEC) in which each firm solves a stochastic Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). We assume a no...