The repeated prisoner's dilemma game has been widely used in analyses of the evolution of reciprocal altruism. Recently it was shown that no pure strategy could be evolutionarily stable in the repeated prisoner's dilemma. Here I show that if there is always some probability that individuals will make a mistake, then a pure strategy can be evolutionarily stable provided that it is "strong perfec...

5 We give an optimal degree condition for a tripartite graph to have 6 a spanning subgraph consisting of complete graphs of order 3. This 7 result is used to give an upper bound of 2∆ for the strong chromatic 8 number of n vertex graphs with ∆ ≥ n/6. 9

The paper addresses the cheating prevention in secret sharing. We consider secret sharing with binary shares. The secret also is binary. This model allows us to use results and constructions from the well developed theory of cryptographically strong boolean functions. In particular, we prove that for given secret sharing, the average cheating probability over all cheating vectors and all origin...

The two important qualities of a cipher is security and speed. Frequently, to satisfy the security of a Boolean function primitive, speed may be traded-off. In this paper we present a general construction that addresses both qualities. The idea of our construction is to manipulate a cryptographically strong base function and one of its affine equivalent functions, using concatenation and negati...

Thermodynamic effects play an important role in the cavitation dynamics of cryogenics fluids. Such flows are characterized by strong variations in fluid properties with the temperature. A compressible, multiphase, one-fluid solver was developed to study and to predict thermodynamic effects in cavitating flows. To close the system, a cavitation model is proposed to capture metastable behaviours ...

For a connected graph G containing no bridges, let D(G) be the family of strong orientations of G; and for any D ∈ D(G), we denote by d(D) the diameter of D. The orientation number −→ d (G) of G is defined by −→ d (G) = min{d(D)|D ∈ D(G)}. Let G(p, q;m) denote the family of simple graphs obtained from the disjoint union of two complete graphs K p and Kq by adding m edges linking them in an arbi...

A feasible alternative x is a strong Condorcet winner if for every other feasible alternative y there is some majority coalition that prefers x to y. Let LC (resp., ℘C) denote the set of all profiles of linear (resp., merely asymmetric) individual preference relations for which a strong Condorcet winner exists. Majority rule is the only non-dictatorial and strategy-proof social choice rule with...

We consider the relation between strategy−proofness of resolute (single−valued) social choice functions and its property which we call Non−negative association property (NNAP) when individual preferences over infinite number of alternatives are continuous, and the set of alternatives is a metric space. NNAP is a weaker version of Strong positive association property (SPAP) of Muller and Sattert...

Let p1 ≤ p2 and consider estimating a fixed set {x : p1 ≤ f(x) ≤ p2} by the random set {x : p1 ≤ f̂n(x) ≤ p2}, where f̂n is a consistent estimator of the continuous function f . This paper gives consistency conditions for these sets, and provides a new method to construct confidence regions from empirical averages of sets. The method can also be used to construct confidence regions for sets of th...