Rational analysis (Anderson 1990, 1991a) is an empirical program of attempting to explain why the cognitive system is adaptive, with respect to its goals and the structure of its environment. We argue that rational analysis has two important implications for philosophical debate concerning rationality. First, rational analysis provides a model for the relationship between formal principles of r...

mega city-regions or metropolitan regions- that was introduced for the first time in a cabinet article in 1995- are becoming a dominant form of human settlements both in developed and developing countries. despite of all contentious discussion on economic and demographic significance of metropolitan regions and so rationality of establishing a distinct structure for their effective management a...

A concern for individual differences has been missing from the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science—the debate about how much irrationality to attribute to human cognition. There are individual differences in rational thinking that are less than perfectly correlated with individual differences in intelligence because intelligence and rationality occupy different conceptual locations in...

Collective rationality in its ordinary sense is rationality’s extension to groups. It does not entail efficiency by definition. Showing that it entails efficiency requires a normative argument. Game theorists treating cooperative games generally assume that collective rationality entails efficiency, but formulating the reasoning that leads individuals to efficiency, and verifying the rationalit...

This paper consists of three sections. Based on subjective certainty, section 1 introduces what the authors term as ordinary rationality, in comparison with the four assumptions for economic rationality. Section 2 briefly distinguishes two levels of hyperbolic phenomenon, prior to and within a certain decision mode. This discussion, while short, functions as a connection between the concept of ...

An informal argument shows that common knowledge of rationality implies the iterative elimination of strongly dominated strategies. Rationality here means that players do not play strategies that are strongly dominated relative to their knowledge. We formalize and prove this claim. When by rationality we mean that players do not play strategies that are weakly dominated relative to their knowle...

Lopes (1996) clearly has limited patience with the Try to work through with undergraduates the equivalence concept of ‘‘rationality’’ as a basis for, or descriptor of, human decision making. I, in contrast, find some of the principles of rationality reasonably compel(x, E; (y, D; z)) B ((x, E; y), D; (x, E; z)), (1) ling—as do subjects when the situation allows them to see the structure of the ...

Herbert Simon was the apostle of bounded rationality. He very often illustrated bounded rationality in the context of the theory of the firm, and was, of course, a major contributor to organizational theory. However, in spite of Simon’s efforts, I argue that bounded rationality has been only incompletely absorbed in the economics of organization, is little used for substantive purposes, and mos...

In his dissertation of 1950, Nash based his concept of solution to a game on the principles that “a rational prediction should be unique, that the players should be able to deduce and make use of it.” In this paper, we address the issue of when such definitive solutions are possible. We assume player rationality at least as strong as Aumann’s rationality. By formalizing Nash’s reasoning, we sho...

A naturalized model of rationality is developed, with a focus on an important but largely neglected aspect: knowledge of error, or ‘‘negative’’ knowledge. The development of knowledge of what counts as error occurs via a kind of internal variation and selection, or quasi-evolutionary, process. Processes of reflection generate a hierarchy of principles of error, a hierarchy that frames and const...