I consider issues in distributed computation that should be of relevance to game theory. In particular, I focus on (a) representing knowledge and uncertainty, (b) dealing with failures, and (c) specification of mechanisms.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D80; D83

Intertemporal correlation aversion is an intuitive concept indicating whether an individual prefers lotteries concerning consumption at different moments in time to be positively or negatively correlated. I show that the difference between the coefficient of relative risk aversion and the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is related, in a simple way, to the index of intert...

We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function. JEL Classification: C70, D11, D80

Using a repeat sales data set, this paper tests whether a single small seller can influence the selling price of their house. We find that this influence exists and that it dominates the influence of commonly-used market conditions. Since the estimated magnitude of this effect is much higher than expected, we verify the estimate using several supplementary tests. JEL: C78, D80, R21, R31

سابقه و هدف: آب هوای یک منطقه در دوره بلندمدت را اقلیم گویند. شناسایی طبقه‌بندی اقلیمی از دیرباز مورد توجه متخصصان هواشناسی بوده است. محققان با به کارگیری روش ­های مختلف استفاده متغیرهای همچون بارش دما، زمین مناطق همگن طبقه ­بندی کرده‌اند نتایج پهنه‌بندی ارزیابی کمبود منابع مقیاس­ های کوچک بزرگ منظور پیش‌بینی اقدامات عملی برای کنترل خشکی آسیب‌پذیر به‌کار برده‌اند. هدف این تحقیق به‌‌روزرسانی تحل...

We study financial intermediation in which sufficient sorting is impossible. We identify a new type of market failure that may occur even when returns of investing entrepreneurs are verifiable. Moreover, we suggest that the nature of competition determines the contracts banks offer. A monopoly bank will offer equity contracts. In any pure strategy equilibrium when lenders compete à la Bertrand,...

We give a formal treatment of optimal risk sharing contracts in the face of ambiguity. The ambiguity in a contract arises from clauses that are interpreted by the parties in di¤erent ways. The cost of ambiguity is represented in terms of perceived dispute costs. Taking the potential for dispute into account, we …nd that risk averse agents may forgo potential gains from risk sharing and choose i...

This paper extends the nonexistence result of Heifetz and Samet (Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 260–273). They have shown that there exists no universal knowledge space to which every knowledge space can be mapped in a knowledge-preserving manner. We show that an analogous nonexistence result holds in the more general context of information structures. These structures can be viewed as generaliza...