The aim of this article is to show that externalist accounts of cognition such as Clark and Chalmers’ (1998) “active externalism” lead to an explosion of knowledge that is caused by online resources such as Wikipedia and Google. I argue that externalist accounts of cognition imply that subjects who integrate mobile Internet access in their cognitive routines have millions of standing beliefs on...

Toward the end of their chapter “Externalism and the Impossibility of Massive Error,” Lepore and Ludwig (2007a, pp. 335–42) explain—correctly, I think—that the privileged position that Davidson grants the radical interpreter in being able to determine all things semantic suggests that his externalism is synchronic and physical. They clarify: “Synchronic externalism holds that our thought conten...

Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). Accordi...

One of the arguments for active externalism (also known as the extended mind thesis) is that if a process counts as cognitive when it is performed in the head, it should also count as cognitive when it is performed in the world. Consequently, mind extends into the world. I argue for a corollary: We sometimes perform actions in our heads that we usually perform in the world, so that the world le...

Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic anti-realism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for anti-realism, insofar as Dummetts pr...

In this paper I identify some unexplored implications of content externalism. The implications can be traced to the role that metaphysical realism plays in some of the standard arguments for content externalism. I do not regard these implications as undermining the case for externalism. I identify them, rather, as part of an attempt at honest accounting: the revisionary nature of content extern...

In this paper I present the idea of a kind of externalism different from what is usually considered in the internalism / externalism debate. It is intersubjective in nature, since it concerns representation determined by relations between cognitive subjects. More precisely, it concerns linguistic expression types. The basic idea is that the meaning of linguistic expression types often depends o...

In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.

Ever since the 1970’s, philosophers of mind have engaged in a lively discussion of Externalism. Externalism is the metaphysical thesis that the contents of one’s thoughts are determined partly by empirical features of one’s environment. Externalism appears to clash with another plausible thesis—the epistemological thesis that one can have knowledge of one’s own thoughts, without evidence or emp...