Mental model ascription can be defined as inferring features of another human or artificial agent that cannot be directly observed, such as that agent’s beliefs, plans, goals, intentions, personality traits, mental and emotional states, and knowledge about the world. This capability is an essential functionality of intelligent agents if they are to engage in sophisticated collaborations with pe...

I explore the possibility that propositional attitudes are not basic in folk psychology, and that what we really ascribe to people are relations to individuals, those that the apparently propositional contents of beliefs, desires, and other states concern. In particular, the relation between a state and the individuals that it tracks shows how ascription of propositional attitudes could grow ou...

The paper explores theoretical shortcomings in the egalitarian theory by John Rawls and provides a complementary view on the problem of morally arbitrary contingencies. The conception of natural lottery, which Rawls presents to signify the starting range of morally arbitrary inequalities, falls short in philosophical grounding. According to critics, the notion of natural lottery appeals to the ...

With the aim of understanding how different mental or intentional states are processed in the brain, the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study examined the brain correlates during the ascription of belief intentional states relative to desire intentional states as well as the effect of incongruent relative to congruent intentional states. To this end, sentences containing s...