This paper extends the Bertrand–Edgeworth price-setting game with finitely many firms to a game with infinitely many firms. Taking a market with one significant firm and a nonatomic fringe, we present a microfoundation of dominant-firm price leadership.  2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.

Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they a...

In [14] Matsuda and Yorozu.explained that there is no special Bertrand curves in Eⁿ and they new kind of Bertrand curves called (1,3)-type Bertrand curves Euclidean space. In this paper , by using the similar methods given by Matsuda and Yorozu [14], we obtain that bitorsion of the quaternionic curve is not equal to zero in semi-Euclidean space E4^2. Obtain (N,B2) type quaternionic Bertrand cur...

In this letter, a multi-user cooperative computing framework is applied to enable mobile users utilize available resources from other neighboring via direct communication links. An incentive scheme based on Bertrand game proposed for the user determine who and xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/199...

For some well-known games, such as the Traveler’s Dilemma or the Centipede Game, traditional game-theoretic solution concepts—and most notably Nash equilibrium—predict outcomes that are not consistent with empirical observations. In this paper, we introduce a new solution concept, iterated regret minimization, which exhibits the same qualitative behavior as that observed in experiments in many ...

This paper contrasts models of common agency in which principals compete in incentive contracts (that is, they make take it or leave it offers) with models where principals offer agents menus of incentive contracts from which the final contract is negotiated. It is shown that pure strategy equilibria in incentive contracts are robust to the possibility that principals might offer menus. In addi...