The Garvey-Kelson relations (GKRs) are algebraic expressions originally developed to predict nuclear masses. In this letter we show that the GKRs provide a fruitful framework for the prediction of other physical observables that also display a slowly-varying dynamics. Based on this concept, we extend the GKRs to the study of nuclear charge radii. The GKRs are tested on 455 out of the approximat...

This paper explores some of the differences between the enactive approach in cognitive science and the extended mind thesis. We review the key enactive concepts of autonomy and sense-making. We then focus on the following issues: (1) the debate between internalism and externalism about cognitive processes; (2) the relation between cognition and emotion; (3) the status of the body; and (4) the d...

The mind-body problem is a continuing issue in philosophy. No surveys known to us have been conducted about the actual preferences of, for example, psychology students for particular preconceptions about the mind-body relation. These preconceptions may have different practical implications for decisions concerning the object and method of research, the choice of explanatory device for psycholog...

ADVANCES Summer 2003, VOL. 19, NO. 2 I want to thank Dr Rossman for so thoughtfully articulating a dilemma faced by many clinicians who work with and support patients, as well as their families, who are struggling with cancer. This dilemma arises when mind/body is divorced from spirit. Addressing spirit enables clinicians to resist the proclivity of conventional medicine to standardize care, ev...

. the auther cocerns the explanation of mind_body relation.he divides the theories into two catagories: non_dualistic and dualistic. he then provides a survey of the main points mentioned in post renaissance europe down to the present, with special regard to post_cartesian philosophers. cartesian philosophy escalated the dualistic character of mind and body up to its apex. he was slated by plat...

If you, like me, always had the suspicion that there should be a straightforward (but possibly very intricate) story about how mind arises out of matter, if you always viewed perspectival problems as not forcing one to abandon physicalism, if you always felt that first person phenomenal experiences convincingly do not hint at some strange sort of unbridgeable explanatory gap, in short, if you b...