This paper develops a theory of regular Markov perfect equilibria in dynamic stochastic games. We show that almost all dynamic stochastic games have a finite number of locally isolated Markov perfect equilibria that are all regular. These equilibria are essential and strongly stable. Moreover, they all admit purification. JEL classification numbers: C73, C61, C62.

The paper proposes an Euler equation technique for analyzing the stability of differentiable stochastic programs. The main innovation is to use marginal reward directly as a Foster–Lyapunov function. This allows us to extend known stability results for stochastic optimal growth models, both weakening hypotheses and strengthening conclusions. JEL classification: C61; C62; O41

We present a hospital non-price competition model to investigate two important concerns when a global budgeting system is applied to the expenditure cap policy and the expenditure target policy. Our results indicate that (1) the treadmill effect, (describing a phenomenon whereby health care providers provide more health care services with a lower reimbursed price under the expenditure cap polic...

This paper shows that in a buffer stock saving model, wealth-to-income and other interesting variables have unique stable invariant distributions. Previously this ergodic property has only been conjectured and demonstrated numerically by means of simulations. The proof proceeds by extending earlier results about the existence and uniqueness of an ergodic distribution to Markov processes on non-...

This paper presents a genetic algorithm to solve the orienteering problem, which is concerned with finding a path between a given set of control points, among which a start and an end point are specified, so as to maximize the total score collected subject to a prescribed distance constraint. Employing several sets of test problems from the literature, the performance of the genetic algorithm i...

We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information to the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no c...

the main purpose of this paper is theoretically to design the optimal intervention in the foreign exchange market in iran, which has not been investigated by previous studies. the economic fundamentals are strongly affected by the optimal foreign exchange intervention, the consistency of foreign exchange intervention with other policies and political authorities' beliefs about the interven...

In this paper we survey recent works on rational inattention (RI) in macroeconomics within the dynamic linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) setting. We first discuss how RI affects consumption smoothness and sensitivity, precautionary savings, asset pricing, portfolio choice, and aggregate fluctuations in the univariate case. We then discuss the applications of RI to macroeconomic models of permanen...

This paper studies the dynamics of durable and nondurable consumption under two alternative assumptions about information updating by households — rational inattention and sticky expectations. We find that sticky expectations due to a fixed cost does a better job of reproducing the infrequent adjustments at the individual level and the slow adjustments at the aggregate level. We then show that ...

We show the existence of an upper bound for the number of blocks required to get from one imputation to another provided that accessibility holds. The bound depends only on the number of players in the TU game considered. For the class of games with non-empty cores this means that the core can be reached via a bounded sequence of blocks. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C73, C61.