Crowdfunding, Cascades and Informed Investors Do higher proportions of (a) informed investors and (b) high-quality projects increase the number of good projects that are ultimately financed via crowdfunding? A simple model and simulation reveals the answers to both questions to be: ‘not necessarily’. JEL Classification: L26, C63, G23

The present note includes explanatory comments about the synergic interaction within the sphere of the socioeconomic analysis between the two following theoretical frameworks: 1. The Darwinian evolutionary model. 2. The computer simulation in accordance with the principia established by Bruno de Finetti and Herbert Simon. J.E.L. Classification: O33, C63, B52

A new algorithm is presented for computing Nash equilibria of ̄nite games. Using Kohlberg and Mertens' structure theorem we show that a homotopy method can be represented as a dynamical system and implemented by Smale's global Newton method. The algorithm is outlined and computational experience is reported. JEL Classi ̄cation C63.

We prove the generality of the methodology proposed in Benigno and Woodford (2006). We show that, even in the presence of a distorted steady state, it is always possible and relatively simple to obtain a purely quadratic approximation to the welfare measure. We also show that, in order to do so, the timeless perspective assumption is crucial. JEL classification: C61, C63

We are concerned with the problem of core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games, which is to decide whether a certain coalition structure belongs to the core of a given game. We show that this problem is co-NP complete when players’preferences are additive. JEL Classi…cation : C71, C63.

This paper studies fitted value iteration for continuous state numerical dynamic programming using nonexpansive function approximators. A number of approximation schemes are discussed. The main contribution is to provide error bounds for approximate optimal policies generated by the value iteration algorithm. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications: C61, C63

We provide a computable algorithm to calculate uniform ε-optimal strategies in two-player zero-sum stochastic games. Our approach can be used to construct algorithms that calculate uniform ε-equilibria and uniform correlated ε-equilibria in various classes of multi-player non-zero-sum stochastic games. JEL codes: C63, C73.

Abstract Background This study aims to evaluate the prevalence and clinical significance of right ventricular pulmonary arterial (RV–PA) uncoupling in patients with cardiac amyloidosis (CA). Methods The population consisted 92 consecutive CA (age 71.1±12.2 years, 71% males; 47% immunoglobulin light chain (AL), 53% transthyretin [ATTR]). All underwent a comprehensive evaluation. A pre–specified ...

This paper extends Carroll’s (2006) endogenous grid method and its combination with value function iteration by Barillas and Fernández-Villaverde (2007) to nonconcave problems. The method is illustrated using a consumer problem in which consumers choose both durable and non-durable consumption. The durable choice is discrete and subject to non-convex adjustment costs. The algorithm yields subst...