We study the problem of allocating objects when monetary transfers are possible. We are interested in mechanisms that allocate the objects in an e cient way and induce the agents to report their true preferences. Within the class of such mechanisms, rst we characterize egalitarian-equivalent mechanisms. Then, we add a bounded-de cit condition and characterize the corresponding class. Finally, w...

This paper analyze Nash’s equilibrium (maximum utilility MU) and its relation with the order state (minimum entropy ME). I introduce the concept of minimum entropy as a paradigm of both Nash-Hayek’s equilibrium. The ME concept is related to Quantum Games. One question arises after completing this exercise: What do the Quantum Mechanics postulates indicate about Game Theory and Economics? Journa...

We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated game with bounded-memory pure strategies. Our result requires each player’s payoff to be strictly above the pure minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor public randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important...

We recently identified a reduction in the neutrophil surface expression of common beta chain (beta c) of the receptor for granulocyte macrophage-colony stimulating factor (GM-CSF) in the patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). To determine the etiology of the impaired beta c expression, beta c mRNA from neutrophilic granulocytes of MDS patients and healthy controls was analyzed by a comb...

We recently identified a reduction in the neutrophil surface expression of common chain ( c) of the receptor for granulocyte macrophage-colony stimulating factor (GM-CSF) in the patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). To determine the etiology of the impaired c expression, c mRNA from neutrophilic granulocytes of MDS patients and healthy controls was analyzed by a combination of direct r...

We study decentralized trade processes in general exchange economies and house allocation problems with and without money. The processes are a¤ected by persistent random shocks stemming from agents’maximization of random utility. By imposing structure on the utility noise term –logit distribution–, one is able to calculate exactly the stationary distribution of the perturbed Markov process for ...

We study a global game in which actions are strategic complements over some region and strategic substitutes over another region. An agent’s payoff depends on a market fundamental and the actions of other agents. If the degree of congestion is sufficiently large, agents’ strategies are non-monotonic in their signal about the market fundamental. In this case, a signal that makes them believe tha...

This paper investigates the implications of normaland extensive-form quantal response equilibrium (QRE) models (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Games and Economic Behavior; 1998, Experimental Economics) in the ultimatum bargaining game, assuming that players maximize expected monetary payo ̄ s. It is shown that normal-form QRE can select a non-sequential equilibrium, and that the selection depends c...

We present experimental results on the ultimatum bargaining game which support an evolutionary explanation of subjects’ behaviour in the game. In these experiments subjects interacted with each other and also with virtual players, i.e. computer programs with prespecified strategies. Some of these virtual players were designed to play the equitable allocation, while others exhibited behaviour cl...