Standard economic intuition of revealed preference implies that when two parties freely enter into a contract then neither should be worse off. In this study, we develop a simple model showing that introducing the opportunity to contract can lower welfare for some, and perhaps all, contracting parties. We consider a situation where processors can obtain inputs from suppliers (farmers) using eit...

the rule of necessity to respect the principle of good faith in performance of the contract is the result of :union: rights and ethics. good faith in performance of the contract with subjective and objective criteria and using cost-benefit analysis, wealth maximization, game theory, efficiency and welfare standards, leading to the achievement of the objectives set by the parties of contract. la...

the condition is related to future and occurrence or undertaking decline depends upon it. not only that matters which aresigned in the contract are necessary to fulfill,but some matters requires approval by both parties according tonorms, situations and rules. predeterminedconditions are examined deeply in imamiyeh jurisprudence and they have to be discussed to evaluate the contractin advance. ...

We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies in the contract they draw up. Ex post, the court observes whether an unforeseen contingency occurred and decides whether to void or uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties can renego...

Contracts are fundamental to the engagement of companies in commercial relations. B2B electronic contracting aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the contracting process and to provide new opportunities for the contracting parties. Virtual enterprises, for example, can be dynamically formed on the basis of e-contracts. For the implementation of e-contracting in practice, an integ...

Operative commencement date of the contract: the first day of the month after the last signature of the contracting parties

Discretionary Latitude and Relational Contracting We use economic experiments to examine the nature of relational trading under a menu of incomplete contracts ranging from the repeat purchase mechanism of Klein and Leffler (1981) to highly incomplete contracts that are completely unenforceable by third-parties. Our results suggest that, with barriers to complete contracting, increasing the degr...

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. We describe and analyze a contractual environment that allows a role for an active court. An active court can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without it. The institutional role of the court is to maximize the parties’...