Most philosophers, whether they consider themselves naturalists or not, typically think that we can talk and think about objects in the world which are themselves independent of our conception of them. Unfortunately, providing a naturalistic explanation of how we can do this has proved notoriously difficult. In particular, naturalistic accounts of intentionality have had problems explaining how...

By “model-theoretic conventionalism” I mean a strong form of semanticism concerning logic. Roughly, the view is that logic (indeed, any logic) is neither more nor less than a theory in a strict model-theoretic sense. Logic is a theory just as, say, ZermeloFraenkel set theory or Peano arithmetic are theories, semantically speaking: they are specified by a certain set of theses and principles exp...

In times of the COVID-19 pandemic, difficult decisions such as distribution ventilators must be made. For many these decisions, humans could team up with algorithms; however, people often prefer human decision-makers. We examined role situational (morality scenario; perspective) and individual factors (need for leadership; conventionalism) algorithm preference in a preregistered online experime...