Control and bribery are settings in which an external agent seeks to influence the outcome of an election. Constructive control of elections refers to attempts by an agent to, via such actions as addition/deletion/partition of candidates or voters, ensure that a given candidate wins. Destructive control refers to attempts by an agent to, via the same actions, preclude a given candidate’s victor...

We prove that an infinite class of Copeland-Erdős numbers is not strongly normal and provide the analogous result for Bugeaud’s Mahler-inspired extension of the Copeland-Erdős numbers. After the presentation of our results, we o↵er several open questions concerning normality and strong normality.

This article draws attention to a central dispute in the interpretation of Church’s Thesis. More precisely, we are concerned with the Church-Turing thesis, as it emerged in 1936 when Church endorsed Turing’s characterization of the concept of effective calculability. (The article by Sieg in this volume details this history. It is valuable also to note from Krajewski, also in this volume, that t...

Recent work on deriving O(log T ) anytime regret bounds for stochastic dueling bandit problems has considered mostly Condorcet winners, which do not always exist, and more recently, winners defined by the Copeland set, which do always exist. In this work, we consider a broad notion of winners defined by tournament solutions in social choice theory, which include the Copeland set as a special ca...

The base-k Copeland-Erdös sequence given by an infinite set A of positive integers is the infinite sequence CEk(A) formed by concatenating the base-k representations of the elements of A in numerical order. This paper concerns the following four quantities. • The finite-state dimension dimFS(CEk(A)), a finite-state version of classical Hausdorff dimension introduced in 2001. • The finite-state ...

Voting method requires to determine group decision of decision by each decision maker in group. Determination of decisions by group of decision maker requires voting methods. Copeland score is one of voting method that has been developed by previous researchers. This method does not accommodate the weight of the expertise and interests of each decision maker. This paper proposed the voting meth...

We study the manipulation problem in elections with bounded singlepeaked width from the parameterized complexity point of view. In particular, we focus on the Borda, Copeland and Maximin voting correspondences. For Borda, we prove that the unweighted manipulation problem with two manipulators is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to single-peaked width. For Maximin and Copeland for every 0 ...