This paper investigates the effectiveness of offering rewards for self reports as a means of combating collusive bribery. Rewarding self reporting theoretically sows distrust between parties tempted to exchange bribes and may reduce bribery even where authorities are otherwise ineffective in uncovering corruption. Our results indicate that offering rewards is weakly effective in reducing collus...

This review synthesizes the literature studying illegality and government corruption in forest management. After discussing the theoretical connections between different types of corruption and illegal forest-related activities it describes the major trends in previous studies, examining crossnational patterns as well as local in-depth studies. Both theory and available empirical findings provi...

This paper develops a principal-agent model to explore the interaction of corruption, bribery, and political oversight of production. Under full information, an honest politician achieves the first best while a dishonest politician creates shortages and bribes. Under asymmetric information, an honest politician may create more shortages relative to a dishonest one, but the latter creates more b...

This paper studies the dynamics of bribery that occurs between citizens and bureaucrats when the formers go to the laters in order to aquire a public service that requires an administrative procedure. The study is based in an agent-based model. Citizens adapt their bribes levels through social learning. Bureaucrats develop their decisions through both individual and social learning mechanisms. ...

We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little ev...

This paper argues that self-reporting schemes whereby citizens report their noncompliance with regulation can prevent corruption in administrations. In our model, entrepreneurs must comply with regulation before undertaking a risky activity. O cials verify compliance before granting permits, and may engage in either bribery or extortion. Without a self-reporting scheme, the government tolerates...

I propose a bribery model with decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy’s productivity due to suppression of small businesses, and reduces the total graft even though it might increase the individual bribe amount. The coordinated deviation to a better participation equilibrium is impossible due to decentralization...

1 Traditionally, national governance and corruption challenges have been seen as a) particularly daunting in the poorer countries, with the richer world viewed as example or benchmark, b) anchored within a legalistic framework and focused on the quality of formal institutions, c) a problem of the public sector, and d) divorced from global governance or security issues, which are regarded as sep...

Harassment bribes, paid by citizens to corrupt officers for services the former are legally entitled to, constitute one of the most widespread forms of corruption in many countries. Nation states have adopted different policies to address this form of corruption. While some countries make both the bribe giver and the bribe taker equally liable for the crime, others impose a larger penalty on co...

Corruption is a negative phenomenon appearing in many subjects of society. In Vietnam’s business sector, the most common form corruption bribery. Bribery to falsify activities undermines development, and innovation reduces labor productivity hinders correct policies Government. recent years, economy has been developing rapidly. However, besides economic Vietnam facing problems business, such as...