We model digital platforms as attention brokers that have proprietary information about their users’ product preferences and sell targeted ad space to retail industries. Retail producers—incumbents or entrants—compete for access this bottleneck. discuss when increased concentration among results in a tightening of the bottleneck, leading higher prices, fewer ads being sold entrants, lower consu...

We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale.  2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D43; L13

We study affine Grassmannians for ramified triality groups. These groups are of type D43, so they forms the orthogonal or spin in 8 variables. They can be given as automorphisms certain twisted composition algebras obtained from octonion algebras. Using these algebras, we give descriptions functors classifying suitable lattices a fixed space.

We use time series techniques to estimate the importance of four main explanations for decline US labor income share: rising firm markups, falling bargaining power workers, higher investment-specific technology growth, and more automated production processes. Identification is achieved with restrictions derived from a stylized model structural change. Our results point automation as driver shar...

We develop a model with finite number of multiproduct firms together continuum single-product and study the dynamics that arise from product innovation. Consistent available evidence, predicts rising markups concentration declining labor share. Our predict possibility an inverted-U relationship between productivity span, for which we provide suggestive evidence. In optimal allocation, span are ...

To better understand temporary price reductions or “sales,” this paper presents a generalized “clearinghouse” framework of advertised sales and explores some applications. By viewing the firms as competing in utility amending conventional tiebreak rule, we allow for multiple dimensions firm heterogeneity complex market environments. Moreover, (i) provide original insights into number types that...

If an aggregative game satisfies the generalized Hahn conditions, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium which may not be interior and is globally asymptotically stable under two alternative continuous adjustment processes with non-negativity constraints. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, L13.

We examine the role low-price guarantees allegedly play in supporting supracompetitive prices. We find that when firms can commit to matching or beating any lower price announced by a competitor, all Nash equilibria yield Bertrand selling prices. This result casts doubt on the robustness of the conclusions of models which restrict attention to meet-the-competition clauses only. JEL Classificati...

This paper analyzes the impact of three termination rules for repeatedgame experiments. We compare treatments with a known finite end, an unknown end and two variants with a random termination rule. The termination rules do not significantly effect cooperation rates. JEL classification numbers: C72, C92, D21, D43

Dynamic entry games are revisited using a Markovian solution concept based on the introduction of long and short time players. This approach provides new insights on the economics of potential competition in particular relative to rent dissipation and selection issues. Potential competition appears less attractive from a normative standpoint. Journal of Economic Literature ClassiÞcation Numbers...