In this paper, we analyse how traders select marketplaces and bid in a setting with multiple competing marketplaces. Specifically, we use a fictitious play algorithm to analyse the traders’ equilibrium strategies for market selection and bidding when their types are continuous. To achieve this, we first analyse traders’ equilibrium bidding strategies in a single marketplace and find that they s...

We examine the impacts of resale opportunity on entry and bidding strategies in simultaneous bidding process (auction mechanism) and sequential bidding process (sequential mechanism) with costly entry, and relative performance between the two mechanisms. Resale opportunity reinforces the partial-pooling equilibrium that a bidder submits a jump bid (even higher than his value) to deter following...

This paper introduces granting of “exclusive bidding rights” to a subset buyers as a way of fostering their pre-auction information acquisition. A revenue maximizing monopolist gives N ef , the socially efficient number of informed buyers, or N ef + 1 buyers the exclusive right to bid, depending on a lumpsum value discovery (VD) cost. In the former case, equilibrium VD is efficient but allocati...

This paper introduces granting of “exclusive bidding rights” to a subset buyers as a way of fostering their pre-auction information acquisition. A revenue maximizing monopolist gives N∗, the socially efficient number of informed buyers, or N∗ + 1 buyers the exclusive right to bid, depending on a lumpsum value discovery (VD) cost. In the former case, equilibrium VD is efficient but allocation is...

In the residential real estate market, sellers arrive dynamically over time to put their units up for sale. These assets may differ in their attributes, including location, size, style, acreage, etc. Sellers themselves differ in their own financial constraints, carrying costs, and their delay tolerances, i.e., how long they are willing to wait until they sell their unit. Buyers arrive dynamical...

This paper describes how introducing statistical dependency among trader values changes the equilibrium bidding strategies in bilateral k-double auctions and uses the special case of affiliation to illustrate the range of equilibrium responses to a change in the value distribution. Consistent with standard intuition, a change from independent to strictly affiliated valuations can result in high...

In current markets of perishable goods such as fish and vegetables, sellers are typically in a weak bargaining position, since perishable products cannot be stored for long without losing their value. To avoid the risk of spoiling products, sellers have few alternatives other than selling their goods at the prices offered by buyers in the markets. The market mechanism needs to be reformed in or...

The sequential auction problem is commonplace in open, electronic marketplaces such as eBay. This problem occurs when a buyer faces a complex strategic problem in bidding across multiple auctions, each selling similar or essentially identical items and when the buyer would have a simple, truth-revealing strategy if there was but a single auction event. Our model allows for multiple, distinct go...

Bidding for multi-items in simultaneous auctions raises challenging problems. In multi-auction settings, the determination of optimal bids by potential buyers requires combinatorial calculations. While an optimal bidding strategy is known when bidding in sequential auctions, only suboptimal strategies are available when bidding for items being sold in simultaneous auctions. We investigate a mul...

Online markets are becoming increasingly prevalent and extend to a wide variety of areas such as e-commerce, Grid computing, recommender systems, and sensor networks. To date, much of the existing research has focused on the design and operation of individual auctions or exchanges for allocating goods and services. In practice, however, similar items are typically offered by multiple independen...