Abstract According to doxastic involuntarism, we cannot believe at will. In this paper, I argue that permissivism, the view that, times, there is more than one way respond rationally a given body of evidence, consistent with involuntarism. Rober (Mind 128(511):837–859, 2019a, Philos Phenom Res 1–17, 2019b) argues since permissive situations are possible, cognitively healthy agents can However, ...

We formalize what it means to have permission to say something. We adapt the dynamic logic of permission by van der Meyden [22] to the case where atomic actions are public truthful announcements. We also add a notion of obligation. Our logic is an extension of the logic of public announcements introduced by Plaza [17] with dynamic modal operators for permission and for obligation. We axiomatize...

It is difficult to write parallel programs that are correct. This is because of the potential for data races, when parallel tasks access shared data in complex and unexpected ways. A classic approach to addressing this problem is dynamic race detection, which has the benefits of working transparently to the programmer and not raising any false alarms. Unfortunately, dynamic race detection is ve...